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I. Introduction and Motivation
The economic crisis that Greece has been experiencing from 2008 on-
ward has been particularly severe. Real gross domestic product (GDP) 
per capita stood at approximately €22,600 in 2008, and dropped to 
€17,000 by 2014, a decline of 24.8%.1 The unemployment rate was 7.8% 
in 2008, and rose to 26.6% in 2014. The entire Greek banking system 
became insolvent during the crisis, and a  large- scale recapitalization 
took place in 2013. In 2012, Greece became the first Organisation for 
Economic Co- operation and Development (OECD) member country to 
default on its sovereign debt, and that default was the largest in world 
history. Greece received financial assistance from other Eurozone (EZ) 
countries and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the size of 
this bailout package was also the largest in history.
The implications of the Greek crisis extended well beyond Greece. 
The bailout package that Greece received was large partly because of 
fears of contagion to other countries in the EZ and to their banking sys-
tems. Moreover, at various stages during the crisis, the continued mem-
bership of Greece in the EZ was put in doubt. This tested the strength 
and the limits of the currency union, and of the European project more 
generally.
This paper provides an “interim” report on the Greek crisis (“interim” 
in the sense that the crisis is still unfolding). We proceed in three steps. 
First, we describe the main macroeconomic dynamics that Greece experi-
enced before and during the crisis. Second, we put these dynamics in per-
spective by benchmarking the Greek crisis against all episodes of sudden 
stops, sovereign debt crises, and lending boom/busts in emerging and 
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advanced economies since 1980. Third, we develop a dynamic stochas-
tic general equilibrium (DSGE) model designed to capture many of the 
relevant features of the Greek crisis and help us identify its main drivers.
The global financial crisis that began in 2007 in the United States hit 
Greece through three interlinked shocks. The first shock was a sovereign 
debt crisis: investors began to perceive the debt of the Greek government 
as unsustainable, and were no longer willing to finance the government 
deficit. The second shock was a banking crisis: Greek banks had diffi-
culty financing themselves in the interbank market, and their solvency 
was put in doubt because of projected losses to the value of their assets. 
The third shock was a sudden stop: foreign investors were no longer will-
ing to lend to Greece as a whole (government, banks, and firms), and so 
the country could not finance its current account deficit.
To many observers, that last shock was a startling development. After 
all, the very existence of a common currency, and therefore of an auto-
matic provision of liquidity against good collateral through its common 
central bank, was supposed to insulate member countries against a 
sudden reversal of private capital of the kind experienced routinely by 
 emerging- market (EM) economies. Just like a sudden stop on California 
or Texas could not happen since Federal Reserve funding would substi-
tute instantly and automatically for private capital, the common view 
was a sudden stop could not happen to Greece or Portugal since Euro-
pean Central Bank (ECB) funding would substitute instantly and auto-
matically for private capital.2 The belief that sudden stops were a thing 
of the past may have, in turn, contributed to the emergence of mount-
ing internal and external imbalances, in Greece and elsewhere in the EZ 
(Blanchard and Giavazzi 2002). Yet, at the onset of the crisis, Greece and 
other EZ members did experience a classic sudden stop. The  built- in 
defense mechanisms of the EZ were activated and the ECB provided 
much needed funding to the Greek economy. How much, then, did this 
sudden stop contribute to the subsequent meltdown and through what 
channels? And what was the contribution of other factors? These are 
among the questions that we seek to address in this paper.
The first main result that emerges from our  macro- benchmarking ex-
ercise is that Greece’s drop in output (a 25% decline in real GDP per 
capita between 2008 and 2013) was significantly more severe and pro-
tracted than during the average crisis. This applies to the sample of 
countries that experienced sudden stops, to the sample that experienced 
sovereign defaults, to the sample that experienced lending booms and 
busts, and even to the sample that experienced all three shocks com-
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bined (we call these episodes “trifectas”). The collapse in investment 
(75% decline between 2008 and 2013) was even more severe. Impor-
tantly, we find that the difference in output dynamics is not driven by 
the  exchange- rate regime. Countries whose currency remains pegged 
experience a larger output drop, on average, than countries with float-
ing rates. But unlike these countries, whose output rebounds after a few 
years, Greece’s output continued to drop to a significantly lower level.
One possible explanation for the severity of Greece’s crisis is the high 
level of debt—government, private, and external—at the onset of the 
crisis. Greece’s government debt stood at 103.1% of output in 2007, its 
net foreign assets at –99.9% of output, and its  private- sector debt at 
92.4% of output. On the former two measures, Greece fared worse than 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, the four other major EZ countries hit 
by the crisis. Greece fared worse than those countries also on its govern-
ment deficit and  current- account deficit, which stood at 6.5% and 15.9% 
of output, respectively, in 2007. And debt levels in Greece were more 
than twice as large than the average of the  emerging- market economies, 
which account for most of the crisis episodes in our sample.
To identify the role of debt, as well as of other factors such as the 
sudden stop of private capital in driving the severity of the Greek cri-
sis, we turn to our DSGE model. The model is designed to capture in a 
simple and stylized manner the three types of shocks that hit Greece. 
It also captures a rich set of interdependencies between the shocks. 
The model features a government, two types of consumers, firms, and 
banks. The government can borrow, raise taxes, spend, and possibly 
default on its debt. Consumers differ in their subjective discount rate. 
Impatient consumers are those who borrow in equilibrium, subject to 
a debt limit. Firms can borrow and invest and face sticky wages and 
prices. Consumers and firms can borrow from banks and can default on 
their debts. The rates at which the government, consumers, and firms 
can borrow depend on the probability with which these entities can 
default and on the losses given default. In turn, the expected costs of 
default (probability times losses) depend on the ratio of debt to income.
In the model, a sovereign risk shock increases the government’s fund-
ing costs. The government responds by increasing taxes and reducing 
expenditures, which exerts a contractionary effect on the economy. In 
turn, the decline in output increases the expected costs of default on 
 private- sector loans, causing funding costs for consumers and firms 
to rise and investment to drop. Conversely, a sudden stop increases 
directly the rate at which consumers and firms can borrow, causing in-
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vestment, consumption, and output to decline. The decline in fiscal rev-
enues pushes up sovereign yields and has an adverse impact on public 
debt dynamics. Hence, in our model, sovereign risks and  private- sector 
risks are intertwined and shocks to one sector of the economy can affect 
funding costs and default rates throughout all sectors.
We estimate the model using Bayesian methods and annual data on 
government revenue and spending, household debt, nonperforming 
loans in the private sector, borrowing rates for the government and the 
corporate sector, as well as price and wage inflation. The model features 
eight stochastic shocks in each year, identical to the number of variables 
that we use in the estimation. We find that the model does an excel-
lent job of matching additional variables such as output, investment, 
and the current account (which the model was not asked to replicate). 
We then perform two tasks with the model. First, we decompose the 
movements in output, investment, and other key variables into the con-
tribution of each type of shock. This helps us determine which shocks 
were the most important in driving the crisis dynamics. Second, we 
use the model to perform a number of “counterfactuals” to identify 
the role played by different aspects of the institutional environment. 
We examine, in particular, how the dynamics of output and investment 
would have been different if debt levels in Greece were set at the av-
erage of  emerging- market economies, if banks’ funding costs had not 
increased during the crisis as a possible effect of a European banking 
union, if the Greek government had followed a more virtuous fiscal 
path in the years preceding the crisis, and if prices and wages had been 
more flexible.
As in Agatha Christie’s Murder on the Orient Express, our model indi-
cates that many forces contributed to the “murder” of the Greek econ-
omy. Yet a few factors stand out. First and most importantly, given the 
size of the fiscal imbalances, a substantial fiscal correction was inevi-
table. According to our estimates, fiscal consolidation accounted for ap-
proximately 50% of the output drop from peak to trough. Much of the 
remainder is explained by the increase in funding costs for the private 
sector (“sudden stop” in our model) and the sovereign (“sovereign risk 
shock”). The combination of the two shocks accounted for an additional 
40% of the output drop from peak to trough, with the sudden stop driv-
ing more than half of the effect.
Lastly, our estimates indicate that markup shocks in product mar-
kets and a surge in nonperforming loans contributed significantly to 
the lack of recovery in 2014 and 2015: in the absence of these shocks, 
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output in 2014–15 would have recovered approximately 35% of its 
peak- to- trough drop. These findings indicate that the external dimen-
sion of the crisis may slowly be fading, and that the forces holding 
back the Greek economy are now largely domestic and microeconomic: 
the recovery will entail cleaning up nonperforming loans and facili-
tating the adjustment of prices relative to wages. The lack of a suffi-
cient price adjustment may have been due to limited competition in 
goods and services markets, as well as to a rise in firms’ costs stemming 
from factors such as the uncertainty about EZ exit and the taxation of 
key inputs.
The effects of the shocks described above were made larger by high 
leverage and low price flexibility. Our counterfactual exercises allow 
us to examine more directly the effects of these factors. We find that if 
the levels of government, private, and external debt in Greece had been 
comparable to those in the average of the  emerging- market economies 
(so smaller by about half), the peak- to- trough decline in output would 
have been smaller by about a third, and the same conclusion holds if the 
prices and wages had been twice as flexible.
II. The Greek Economy before and during the Crisis
This section describes the dynamics of key macroeconomic variables in 
Greece before and during the crisis. We focus on the behavior of output 
and investment, as well as on the accumulation of debt—government, 
private, and external. We also describe the three shocks through which 
the global financial crisis affected Greece (sudden stop, sovereign debt 
crisis, and banking crisis) as well as their interrelationships. This sets 
the stage for the empirical exercise in section III, and motivates some of 
the modeling choices and analysis in sections IV–VI.
A. Pre- crisis
Output
Figure 1 plots GDP per capita in 2014 US dollars, adjusted for purchas-
ing power parity (PPP) and in a log scale from 1980 onward. In this 
figure, as well as in subsequent figures and tables in this section, we 
compare Greece to the four other major Eurozone (EZ) countries that 
were hit by the EZ crisis: Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Spain (ES), and Por-
tugal (PT).
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As of 1980, Greek GDP per capita was above that of Ireland, Por-
tugal, and Spain. During the 1980s, Greece experienced relative stag-
nation and was overtaken by Ireland and Spain. Greece grew faster 
during the period 1996–2000 and especially from 2001, when it entered 
the Eurozone (EZ), until 2008. By 2008, Greece had almost caught up 
with Spain.
Motivated by figure 1, we divide the period 1996–2014 into three 
subperiods: the period 1996–2000, during which Greece experienced a 
boom in anticipation of EZ entry; the period 2001–2008, during which 
the boom continued with Greece inside the EZ; and the crisis period 
2009–2014. In the tables constructed in the rest of this section, we report 
averages of macroeconomic variables for the three subperiods. In some 
of the tables we also compare with the year 1995, which we take as in-
dicative of the Greek economy before the (actual or anticipated) effects 
of EZ entry.3
Investment
Table 1 reports the level of investment in Greece during the periods 
1996–2000, 2001–2008, and 2009–2014, and compares with 1995. The 
table also decomposes investment into corporate, residential, and 
public and compares with Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. Greece 
experienced the  second- largest increase in corporate investment from 
Fig. 1. GDP per capita for Greece and other EZ crisis countries, 1980–2014
Source: The data come from the Conference Board Total Economy Database. The GDP is 
expressed in 2014 US dollars, is adjusted for PPP using 2011 weights, and is plotted in a 
log scale.
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Fig. 2. Net foreign assets in Greece and other EZ crisis countries, 1980–2014, as per-
centage of GDP.
Source: The data come from Lane and  Milesi- Ferretti (2007).
1995 to 1996- 2000, after Portugal. Corporate investment remained at 
that elevated level during 2001- 2008. Thus, EZ entry and its anticipation 
was associated with a significant rise in corporate investment in Greece. 
That rise, however, occurred from a low base, and corporate investment 
remained significantly lower than in the other countries.
Unlike Ireland and Spain, Greece did not experience a significant 
increase in residential investment from 1995 to 1996–2008. Residential 
investment was already high in 1995, however, and the real estate boom 
in Ireland and Spain only meant that residential investment in those 
countries caught up with and exceeded somewhat that in Greece.
Net Foreign Assets 
The fast growth of Greek GDP per capita during the period 1996–2008 
was associated with an increase in external indebtedness. Figure 2 plots 
net foreign assets (NFA) from 1980 onward as percentage of GDP. The 
NFA for Greece were negative throughout that period. They were a 
relatively small fraction of GDP in absolute value until the mid- 1990s, 
and they subsequently declined to a much more negative fraction. 
Greece’s NFA position deteriorated at a comparable rate to Portugal’s 
and Spain’s, while Ireland experienced a more abrupt deterioration. 
The behavior of Greece’s NFA from the mid- 1990s onward is indicative 
of large current account deficits. Table 2 reports the level of the current 
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account in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain during the periods 
1996–2000, 2001–2008, and 2009–2014, and compares with 1995. The 
table decomposes the current account into (a) net exports and (b) the 
sum of net current transfers and net primary income.
Greece’s current account deteriorated from 1995 to 1996–2000, and 
deteriorated further from 2001 to 2008. The deterioration from 1996–
2000 to 2001–2008 was particularly severe: 6.0% of GDP, larger than in 
the other countries. From 2001 to 2008, Greece was running an average 
current account deficit of 11.7% of GDP, also larger than in the other 
countries.
The deterioration of Greece’s current account from 1995 onward was 
primarily driven by a decline in net current transfers and net primary 
income. Net current transfers to Greece declined partly because of the 
drop in EU subsidies, especially after the 2005 EU enlargement, as 
funds were redirected to new entrants that were poorer than Greece. 
Net primary income also declined because workers’ remittances be-
came smaller as Greece became a net immigration country and because 
of growing interest payments on Greece’s rising external debt. Greece’s 
trade balance also deteriorated through that period, reaching –10.6% of 
GDP during the period 2001–2008.
The increase in Greece’s current account deficit from 1995 to 1996–
2000 was associated with an increase in corporate investment and, 
hence, in productive capacity. Indeed, the current account deficit in-
creased by 2.9% of GDP, corporate investment increased by 2.1%, and 
public investment by 0.4%. The increase in the current account deficit 
from 1996–2000 to 2001–2008, however, was associated with an increase 
in consumption. Indeed, the current account deficit increased by 6.0% of 
GDP, total saving declined by 6.7%, and corporate investment dropped 
slightly. The decline in total saving from 1996–2000 to 2001–2008 was 
primarily driven by private saving, which declined by 4.3% of GDP.4
Government Debt
Figure 3 plots government debt from 1980 onward, as percentage of 
GDP. As of 1980, government debt in Greece was 21.4% of GDP, lower 
than in all other countries except for Spain. Debt rose sharply during 
the 1980s, and by 1993 it had reached 94.4% of GDP, a level larger than 
in all other countries except for Italy. A combination of fiscal tighten-
ing to meet the criteria for EZ entry, and sharply lower interest rates 
in anticipation of that entry, helped stabilize and even reduce slightly 
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the ratio of debt to GDP to 88.5% in 1999. Budget discipline became 
looser after EZ entry, and especially after 2007. As a consequence, debt 
to GDP increased—to 103.1% in 2007 and 126.8% in 2009—despite the 
fast growth in GDP during the period 2001–2008.
While debt to GDP increased only mildly from 1999 to 2007, there 
was a sharp increase in the amount of the debt held by foreign entities 
and a consequent decrease in the amount held domestically. That trend 
was due mainly to the decline in private saving. Figure 4 plots gross 
government external debt for Greece, and compares with the same se-
Fig. 4. Gross government external debt for Greece, Portugal, and Spain, 1999–2013, as 
percentage of GDP.
Source: The data come from the ECB, series “gross external debt: government.” The data 
are quarterly, and we report the average over each year.
Fig. 3. Government debt in Greece and other EZ crisis countries, 1980–2014, as per-
centage of GDP.
Source: The data come from AMECO, series “general government consolidated gross debt.”
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ries for Portugal and Spain, and with Greece’s NFA.5 Gross government 
external debt for Greece essentially coincides with the negative of NFA. 
By contrast, gross government external debt for Portugal and Spain is 
significantly lower than the negative of those countries’ NFA (which 
are not plotted, but are similar to Greece’s from figure 2). Figure 4 thus 
indicates that Greece’s current account deficit essentially financed gov-
ernment borrowing.6
Figure 5 plots government deficit as percentage of GDP. The figure com-
pares Greece to Italy, which was the most similar to Greece in terms of the 
size of its government debt until the crisis, and to the EU average. The 
figure shows that Greece’s public finances improved in the run- up to EZ 
entry, but worsened steadily post- entry. The pre- entry improvement was 
similar to that in Italy and the EU average. Unlike in Greece, however, the 
latter series remained relatively stable post- entry and until the crisis.
Banks and Credit
From the mid- 1990s until the crisis, Greece experienced a boom in 
private credit. An extensive program of financial liberalization that took 
Fig. 5. Government deficit in Greece, Italy, and the EU average, 1985–2014, as percent-
age of GDP.
Source: The data come from the EC, series “surplus (net lending or net borrowing: general 
government).”
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place in the late 1980s and the 1990s paved the way for the credit boom. 
It was also fueled by easier access to foreign capital following EZ entry 
(and the anticipation of it). Figure 6 plots bank loans to the nonfinancial 
private sector for Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain, as percent-
age of GDP.
Private- sector loans to GDP were significantly lower in Greece than 
in the other countries before EZ entry: they stood at 34.1% of GDP in 
1998, compared to 60.8% in Italy, 74.6% in Spain, 80.31% in Portugal, 
and 82.8% in Ireland. Loans to GDP grew faster in Greece than in any 
other country, however, after EZ entry. As of 2008, they stood at 103.0%, 
a ratio smaller than Ireland’s, Portugal’s, and Spain’s, but larger than 
Italy’s.
To finance their increasing lending activity, Greek banks became more 
reliant on wholesale funding through the interbank market. Figure 7 
plots gross external debt for Greek banks and compares with Italy, Por-
tugal, and Spain. Gross external debt of banks consists mainly of inter-
bank loans. Gross external debt of Greek banks increased from 12.3% of 
GDP in 1999 to 46.2% of GDP in 2008. As in the case of  private- sector 
loans to GDP, the growth rate was higher than in the other countries, and 
the 2008 level was smaller than Portugal’s and Spain’s, but larger than 
Italy’s.
Fig. 6. Bank loans to the private sector excluding financial firms in Greece and other 
EZ crisis countries, 1998–2014, as percentage of GDP.
Source: The loans data come from the Bank of Greece (BoG) in the case of Greece and from 
the European Central Bank (ECB) for the other countries. The loan data are monthly and 
are sampled in December of each year.
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B. Crisis
The Three Shocks 
The global financial crisis that began in 2007 found Greece in a highly 
vulnerable position. As of 2007, Greece’s current account deficit had 
reached 15.9% of GDP, NFA stood at –99.9%, government deficit at 
6.5%, and government debt at 103.1%. On all four measures, Greece 
fared worse than Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. Greece’s bank-
ing system was also vulnerable. While the ratio of  private- sector loans 
to GDP in Greece was lower than in Ireland, Portugal, and Spain, the 
exposure of Greek banks to their sovereign was larger than in those 
countries.
Greece was hit by three interdependent shocks during the crisis. The 
first shock was a sovereign debt crisis: investors began to perceive the 
debt of the Greek government as unsustainable, and were no longer 
willing to finance the government deficit. The second shock was a bank-
ing crisis: Greek banks had difficulty financing themselves, and their 
solvency was put in doubt because of projected losses to the value of 
their assets. The third shock was a sudden stop: foreign investors were 
no longer willing to lend to Greece as a whole (government, banks, and 
Fig. 7. Gross external debt of financial firms for Greece and other EZ crisis countries, 
1999–2013, as percentage of GDP.
Source: The data come from the ECB, series “Gross External Debt: MFIs.” The data are 
quarterly and we report the average over each year. We exclude the series for Ireland, 
which rises up to 425% of GDP, so that the series for the other countries can be seen more 
clearly.
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firms), and so the country could not finance its current account deficit, 
nor roll over its maturing gross liabilities.
The three shocks were interlinked. The banking crisis made the gov-
ernment’s fiscal problems worse. This was because the government 
had to inject equity capital into the banks and had to provide them 
with guarantees so that they could borrow in the interbank market. 
Moreover, because banks had to curtail their lending, the economy 
slowed down and the government’s tax revenues declined. These 
channels were at play starting from the fall of 2008, when Greek banks 
faced significant difficulties financing themselves in the interbank 
market. The Greek government passed a law in December 2008 that 
provided support to the banks in the form of guarantees and equity 
capital.
Conversely, the sovereign crisis made the banks’ liquidity and 
solvency problems worse. This was because concerns about default 
risk by the Greek government reduced the value of the Greek banks’ 
 government- bond portfolio, and this put the banks’ solvency in 
doubt. Moreover, the government had to engage in significant fiscal 
tightening, and the ensuing recession meant that firms and house-
holds had difficulty repaying their loans, adding to the banks’ sol-
vency problems. Finally, the guarantees given by the government to 
Greek banks diminished in value. That applied both to the guarantees 
intended to help the banks borrow in the interbank market and to the 
 government- supplied deposit insurance. Hence, banks had more dif-
ficulties financing themselves and their liquidity problems worsened. 
These channels were at play beginning in September 2009, when in-
vestors began to perceive the debt of the Greek government as unsus-
tainable.
Both the sovereign and the banking crises were closely linked to the 
sudden stop. Indeed, most of government debt was held by foreign 
investors: out of government debt equal to 103.1% of GDP in 2007, the 
debt held by foreign investors was 76.1% of GDP. Greek financial firms 
also had significant foreign debt: their gross external debt was 41.8% of 
GDP in 2007. Since the Greek government and Greek banks intermedi-
ated most of the flow of foreign capital to Greece, the withdrawal of 
foreign capital meant that both sectors’ access to funds was seriously 
impaired.
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain were hit by some or all of the same 
shocks. The shocks’ effects were more severe in the case of Greece, how-
ever, given the country’s larger vulnerability.7
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Assistance to the Sovereign and Sovereign Default
In May 2010, Greece agreed to follow an adjustment program financed 
and monitored by European institutions and the IMF. Under the terms 
of the agreement, Greece received a loan so as to avoid a default on its 
private creditors and reduce its government deficit more smoothly. In 
exchange, it had to engage in significant fiscal tightening and imple-
ment a battery of structural reforms. The agreed loan amount was 110 
billion euros, or 44% of Greece’s 2010 GDP. Out of that amount 80 bil-
lion came from other EZ countries, and the remaining 30 billion from 
the IMF. The first adjustment program was rolled over into a second, 
agreed to in February 2012. A third program began in August 2015.
In March 2012, Greece agreed to a debt restructuring with its private 
creditors. Under the terms of this  private- sector involvement (PSI), pri-
vately held government debt with face value of 199.2 billion euros was 
replaced by debt with a face value of 92.1 billion. Greece was the only 
EZ country to default on its creditors.
Assistance to the Banks, Recapitalizations, and Capital Controls
In addition to the loans made to the Greek government under the adjust-
ment programs, assistance was provided to Greece through ECB loans to 
its banking system. These loans were administered either directly from 
the ECB, with a low interest rate and stringent collateral requirements, or 
indirectly via the Bank of Greece (BoG) as emergency liquidity assistance 
(ELA), with a higher interest rate and less stringent collateral requirements. 
The ECB loans were necessary to address the liquidity problems of Greek 
banks. They rose from 48 billion euros in January 2010 to a maximum of 
158 billion euros in February 2012, then dropped to a minimum of 45 bil-
lion euros in November 2014, and then rose again to a maximum of 122 bil-
lion in September 2015. The ECB loans were at their maxima around times 
when there was a high- perceived risk of Greece exiting the EZ (Grexit). 
The risk of Grexit was high around the double election of May and June 
2012, and during the first half of 2015 after a new Greek government op-
posed to the adjustment programs had been elected in January 2015.
Greek banks went through a series of recapitalizations. Losses on the 
banks’  government- bond portfolio reduced the capital of all banks and 
rendered most of the large ones insolvent. Some of the banks were re-
solved, and their deposits and some of the loans were transferred to the 
four largest banks. The latter were recapitalized. The resolution and re-
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capitalization process was completed in July 2013, and involved 38.9 bil-
lion euros of public funds, which were loaned to Greece. An additional 
3.1 billion euros were raised by private investors. That first,  large- scale 
recapitalization was followed by a second in April and May 2014, when 
the banks raised 8.3 billion euros, solely from private investors. A third 
recapitalization took place in the fourth quarter of 2015. The total amount 
that was raised then was 13.7 billion euros, of which 8 billion euros was 
raised from private sources via new investment and debt- equity conver-
sions. The second and third recapitalizations were made necessary be-
cause of increased projected losses on banks’ loans to the private sector.
Macroeconomic Developments
We finally review the macroeconomic developments during the crisis 
period 2009–2014, following a roughly similar order as for the pre- 
crisis period. Greek GDP per capita declined sharply during the crisis, 
as shown in figure 1. The decline was 25.8% between 2008 and 2014. It 
was much sharper than in Ireland (6.1%), Italy (10.3%), Portugal (7.8%), 
and Spain (9.6%).
The decline in GDP was accompanied by a large decline in invest-
ment. The latter decline can be seen in table 1 by comparing the crisis 
period with the pre- crisis one. It can be seen more sharply by compar-
ing investment in 2014 to that in 2008. Investment in 2014 was less than 
half of its 2008 value, having dropped by 12.2% of GDP. Both the rela-
tive and the absolute declines were larger than in Ireland, Italy, Portu-
gal, and Spain. The level of investment in 2014 was also significantly 
lower than in the other countries.
During the crisis, Greece reduced and almost eliminated its current 
account deficit. That deficit stood at 2.2% of GDP in 2014, down from 
16.5% in 2008. The adjustment occurred entirely through a drop in in-
vestment. Total saving did not change: government saving increased 
as a result of the fiscal tightening that took place during the crisis, but 
that effect was offset by a decline in private saving. Private saving in 
Greece declined between 2008 and 2014, while it increased in Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal, and Spain. Conversely, government saving increased in 
Greece during the same period, while it declined in the other countries. 
Thus, the austerity undergone by Greece during the crisis was more 
severe than in the other countries.
During the crisis, public debt to GDP followed explosive dynamics, 
rising from 103.1% in 2007 and 126.8% in 2009 to 177.1% in 2014. The in-
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crease resulted from the deficits run during the crisis and from the drop 
in GDP. The debt restructuring agreed to in 2012 countered these effects 
somewhat.8 Greece eliminated its primary budget deficit in 2014—it ran 
a primary surplus of 0.4% in that year.
The ratio of  private- sector loans to GDP declined slowly during the 
crisis. As figure 6 shows, it stood at almost the same level as Portugal’s 
and Spain’s in 2014, and above Ireland’s and Italy’s. The slow decline 
of  private- sector loans to GDP in Greece is due to the sharp decline in 
GDP and the relatively slow pace of resolving nonperforming loans.
III. Benchmarking the Greek Crisis
The previous section argued that Greece experienced three  quasi- 
simultaneous and interlinked shocks: a sudden stop, with the abrupt 
withdrawal of private foreign capital starting in 2009; a sovereign 
debt crisis, with rapidly deteriorating fiscal accounts in 2008 and 2009, 
culminating in a sovereign default in 2012; and a banking crisis with 
the bursting of a boom in credit to the private nonfinancial sector in 
2008 and 2009. This section provides a systematic comparison between 
Greece and other countries experiencing each type (and sometimes 
combinations) of similar shocks.
A. The Incidence of Crisis
We begin by identifying episodes of sudden stops, sovereign defaults, 
and lending booms/busts.
Sudden Stops
Starting with the work of Dornbusch and Werner (1994), Calvo et al. 
(2006), Adalet and Eichengreen (2007), and many others, an abundant 
literature has explored the macroeconomic consequences of a sudden 
reversal in foreign lending. Calvo et al. (2006), in particular, compiled 
a list of 33 sudden stop episodes between 1980 and 2004 for a sample 
of 31 emerging markets. In the authors’ classification, a sudden stop is 
identified by the combination of (a) a reversal in capital flows; (b) an 
increase in  emerging- market bond spreads, capturing times of global 
stress on financial markets; and (c) a large drop in domestic output. 
Mendoza (2010) adopts a similar classification, while Korinek and Men-
doza (2014) extend the Calvo et al. (2006) sample to 2012 and to ad-
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vanced economies.9 As in these earlier papers, we define the year t of a 
sudden stop episode as the year of a sharp reduction in foreign lending 
that coincides with a large decline in output.10 With this criterion, we 
identify 49 sudden stop events, 36 for  emerging- market economies, and 
13 for advanced economies (see table 3).
Sovereign Defaults
We identify sovereign debt crisis as in Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012). 
The year t of a sovereign debt crisis corresponds to the year identified 
with a default on domestic or external public debt, as tabulated by Re-
inhart and Rogoff (2009), Cantor and Packer (1995), Chambers (2011), 
Moody’s (2009) and Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2007).11 Since 1980, 
we record 64 default episodes in  emerging- market economies, and one 
in an advanced economy: Greece in 2012.
Lending Booms/Busts
Credit boom episodes are defined as in Gourinchas, Valdés, and 
Landerretche (2001), from the deviation of the ratio of credit to the 
nonfinancial sector to output from its trend.12 A lending boom episode 
is recorded when this cyclical deviation exceeds a given boom thresh-
old. The year t of the lending boom then coincides with the year in 
which the maximum (positive) deviation of credit to GDP occurs. Our 
calculations identify 114 lending boom episodes, 96 of which are in 
 emerging- market economies.
Finally, we identify “trifecta” episodes: sovereign defaults that coincide 
with a lending boom and a sudden stop.13 We find nine such crises for 
emerging markets, including well- known episodes such as Mexico in 
1982, Chile and Uruguay in 1983, Indonesia and Russia in 1998, Ecua-
dor in 1999, Argentina and Turkey in 2001, and Uruguay again in 2003. 
Again, Greece is the only advanced economy to have experienced a 
trifecta crisis in our sample.
Table 3 reports the incidence of each type of crisis for advanced and 
 emerging- market economies. It illustrates the relative prevalence of 
sovereign defaults, lending booms, and trifecta crises among emerging 
economies. By contrast, sudden stops are roughly distributed in pro-
portion to the number of countries in each group in our sample.
We compare each type of episode to the Greek crisis. For the purpose 
of this exercise, we consider that the Greek episode begins in 2010.14
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B. The Data
We construct a database of macrovariables for a large sample of ad-
vanced and emerging economies between 1980 and 2014.15 The sample 
contains 22 advanced economies (including Greece) and 57  emerging- 
market economies, distributed across six broad regions. The list of 
 emerging- market economies includes all countries classified as emerg-
ing according to leading outlets and are therefore reasonably well inte-
grated into global bond markets.16
In the spirit of a large literature in international macroeconomics, we 
examine the behavior of key macroeconomic variables around the three 
types of shocks discussed above: sudden stops, sovereign debt crises, 
and lending boom/busts episodes, as well as trifecta crises.17 Our event 
study considers the response of seven macroeconomic variables: out-
put, consumption, investment, exports and imports of goods and ser-
vices, the current account, credit to the nonfinancial sector, and public 
debt. The data is collected from the World Bank’s Development Indica-
tors, the IMF’s International Financial Statistics, and Reinhart and Rog-
off (2009) estimates of total (domestic and external) gross public debt 
for a large number of countries.18 In addition to these macroeconomic 
variables, we use the Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) and Ilzetzki, Reinhart, 
and Rogoff (2010) de facto exchange rate regime classification and sort 
countries into “pegs” or “floats” based on the exchange rate regime 
in the year preceding the episode. Further, we split pegs into “de- 
peggers,” that is, countries that abandon their peg within two years 
of the shock, and “strict peggers” who maintain their peg for at least 
two years. This will allow us to contrast the macroeconomic response 
of countries based on their post- shock exchange rate regime. This is an 
important consideration given the  often- heard argument that the main 
constraint on the Greek economy is its lack of nominal exchange rate 
flexibility (e.g., see Krugman 2012).
Table 3
Crises Incidence in Advanced and Emerging Economies, 1980–2014
  
Sudden 
Stop  
Sovereign 
Default  
Lending 
Boom  Trifecta  
No.  
Countries
Advanced economies 13 1 18 1 22
Emerging markets 36 64 96 9 57
Total  49  65  114  10  79
Note: Details on how each type of episode is identified are in the appendix.
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C. Findings
Figure 8 reports the output response to a typical sudden stop across the 48 
episodes (excluding Greece). It measures output per capita, relative to its 
pre- crisis level at t – 2, in 100 log points, so that a value of x indicates that 
output per capita is ex/100 times pre- crisis output. The figure also includes 
 point- wise, one- sided 10% confidence intervals (the grayed area), as well 
as the trajectory of Greek output (bullet points) during the 2010 episode. As 
expected, since our definition of sudden stops requires a large output drop, 
the mean response indicates a sharp decline in output, marginally signifi-
cant, close to 10% below its peak in the year of the sudden stop, followed 
by a gradual recovery. By year t + 2, output has typically recovered to its 
pre- crisis level and continues to expand. Two facts are relevant here. First, 
Greece experienced a strikingly worse output decline. By 2013, that is, t + 
3, Greek output per capita was 25% below its pre- crisis level (e–0.29 = 0.75), 
significantly below the average response and showing few signs of re-
covery. Second, unlike the typical sudden stop, Greece’s output path 
was “back loaded.” The initial recession in 2009 and 2010 (t – 1 and t) is 
similar to a typical sudden stop episode and milder than the subsequent 
Fig. 8. The response of output to a sudden stop
Source: See the appendix for data sources.
Note: The figure reports real output per capita relative to period t – 2, in 100 log points 
for a typical sudden stop episode (with output collapse) and for Greece in the 2010 crisis.
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decline in Greek output. By contrast, typical episodes are “front loaded” 
with a more pronounced “V” shape.19 This is not surprising if we con-
sider that Greece’s sudden stop was of a particular nature. As discussed 
in the previous section, the sudden withdrawal of foreign lending was 
accommodated initially via ECB lending against collateral, and after 2010 
via official assistance from the IMF and the European Union. Hence there 
was no sharp immediate downturn, as is typical when countries experi-
ence sudden loss of market access.
Claim 1. The Greek crisis was significantly more severe, persistent, and back 
loaded than the typical sudden stop.
Figure 9 reports a similar analysis for the consumption and invest-
ment ratios to output. As for output, each variable is expressed in 100 
log points, relative to its value at t – 2, that is, at the beginning of the 
episode. Equivalently, this figure reports the growth differential be-
tween consumption or investment and output since t – 2. The top panel 
reports the  consumption- to- output ratio. In a typical sudden stop, con-
sumption mostly moves in line with output. Instead, Greek consump-
tion grew modestly faster than output, although not significantly so. 
The bottom panel reports the  investment- to- output ratio. Greek invest-
ment collapsed dramatically, much more so than in a typical sudden 
stop. By 2013, that is, t + 3, the  investment- to- output ratio was less than 
half of its pre- crisis level (e–0.76 = 0.47), while a typical sudden stop sees 
a decline of 20% to 30%. Given the decline in output per capita docu-
mented in figure 8, real investment per capita collapsed by almost two- 
thirds between 2008 and 2013 (0.75 × 0.47 = 0.35).
Claim 2. The collapse in Greek aggregate investment in this crisis was unprece-
dented in its persistence and magnitude, in comparison to the typical sudden stop.
A sudden withdrawal of foreign capital is only one of the shocks that 
Greece experienced since 2009, and one might be concerned that the 
previous comparison might be too unfavorable to Greece. For instance, 
like Greece in 2010, Argentina in 2001, Chile in 1983, or Indonesia in 
1998, among others, experienced a simultaneous  drying- up of foreign 
capital, a sovereign default, and a collapse in lending, that is, a trifecta 
shock. These episodes are among the worst documented economic 
crises in postwar history, often accompanied by a banking crisis, and 
unprecedented levels of economic hardship and political turmoil. In 
light of the economic and political dislocation associated with it, one 
would expect the Greek crisis to be on a comparable scale. To investi-
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Fig. 9. The response of consumption and investment to a sudden stop
Source: See the appendix for data sources.
Note: The figure reports the  consumption- output ratio (top panel) and the investment 
output ratio (bottom panel) relative to period t – 2 in 100 log points for a typical sudden 
stop episode (with large output collapse) and for Greece in 2010. 
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gate this, figure 10 reports the average output response to each of the 
following shocks: a sovereign default, a lending boom/bust, as well as 
the trifecta shock that consists of these two shocks occurring during a 
sudden stop episode. As an additional point of comparison, the figure 
also includes the average output response for Ireland, Italy, Portugal, 
and Spain, that is, the other peripheral countries most affected by the 
Eurozone crisis (under the label IIPS). Finally, the graph also includes 
10%  point- wise, one- sided confidence intervals for the trifecta shocks.
The figure illustrates how much of an outlier the Greek crisis truly 
was. While output per capita initially declined in line with that of a 
trifecta crisis, by 2011 (i.e., t + 1) output had declined significantly more 
and kept falling. By contrast, in a typical trifecta crisis, output is back 
to its pre- crisis level by t + 3. The figure allows us to make a number 
of additional points. First, trifecta crises are more severe than a typi-
cal default crisis, although the differences are small and often insignifi-
cant. Second, following a lending boom, output keeps growing. This is 
because many lending booms in our sample are not always followed 
by an economic downturn or crisis, as noted also by Gourinchas et al. 
Fig. 10. The response of output to various crises
Source: See the appendix for data sources.
Note: The figure reports the mean output per capita relative to period t – 2 in 100 log 
points for various episodes, and for Greece in 2010; 10% one- sided,  point- wise confidence 
intervals for trifecta episodes.
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(2001) and Ranciere, Tornell, and Westermann (2008). Lastly, the trajec-
tory for the IIPS countries illustrates that, in these countries too, the 
crisis has been much more persistent then expected, with output still 
7% below the pre- crisis level as of 2014 (t + 4).
Claim 3. The collapse in Greek output per capita has been significantly more 
severe and more persistent than the typical trifecta crisis.
Figure 11 makes the same point even more vividly. The panel on the 
left reports the output trajectory for all countries that experienced a sud-
den stop in our sample. The panel on the right presents similar results 
for all trifecta episodes. Both panels also report the Greek 2010 episode. 
As is clear from both figures, Greece’s economic performance is cumu-
latively much worse than all episodes from the last 35 years, including 
crises such as Argentina in 2001 or Uruguay in 1983, with the single 
exception of the United Arab Emirates crisis of 2009.20
We next consider the role of the exchange rate regime. Our data set 
includes information on the de facto exchange rate regime from Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2004) and Ilzetzki et al. (2010). We use this data to construct 
an indicator of the exchange rate regime in the year of the shock and the 
preceding year (peg/float). We further subdivide pegs based on whether 
countries maintain their peg for at least two years after the crisis (strict 
peggers) or abandoned it (de- peggers).21 Figure 12 contrasts the output 
response following an emerging market sudden stop for de- peggers, 
strict peggers, and floaters, together with that of Greece and of the IIPS 
countries. The figure also includes 10%  point- wise, one- sided confidence 
intervals for strict peggers. Unsurprisingly, we find that strict peggers 
experience a worse adjustment than de- peggers, who in turn perform 
worse than floaters: by t + 4, output is still 4% below its pre- crisis level 
for strict peggers, while it is 3% (resp. 8%) above its trend for de- peggers 
(resp. floaters): a more flexible exchange rate regime is associated with a 
less severe and less persistent crisis. Greece’s experience is very singular 
in that respect as well: its output loss is much larger and significantly 
more persistent than for countries that maintained their exchange rate. 
By contrast, the experience of the IIPS countries is more in line with that 
of strict peggers, albeit less severe in 2010 and 2011 (t and t + 1).
There are two ways to think about this result. One possible inter-
pretation is that the severity of the Greek crisis cannot be attributed 
entirely to the strictures of the common currency, since it significantly 
underperformed other “strict fixers.” This would direct our attention 
toward other features of the Greek economy than just the exchange rate 
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Fig. 11. The distribution of output responses to sudden stops and trifecta crises
Source: See the appendix for data sources.
Note: The figure reports output per capita relative to period t – 2 in 100 log points for each 
sudden stop episode (top panel), and for each trifecta crises (bottom panel), together with 
Greece in 2010.
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regime. This is not the only interpretation. Clearly, countries can and 
often choose their exchange rate regime in response to the economic 
environment. Therefore, the sample of strict fixers may consist precisely 
of countries who stand to lose relatively less from keeping the exchange 
rate pegged in the aftermath of a sudden stop. This could be the case 
in particular if these countries were experiencing a relatively modest 
decline in output. To investigate this question further, figure 13 reports 
the data for strict fixers alongside that for Estonia, Latvia, and Greece. 
Both Latvia and Estonia experienced severe recessions following their 
2009 sudden stop episode. Estonia’s output per capita declined by 19% 
between 2007 and 2009, while that of Latvia declined by 17% between 
2007 and 2010. Nevertheless, both countries chose to maintain their peg 
to the euro and “doubled down” by subsequently adopting the com-
mon currency in January 2011 for Estonia and January 2014 for Latvia. 
Overall, both countries have an experience similar to that of the full 
sample of strict peggers. Yet, it could hardly be argued that the costs 
Fig. 12. The role of the exchange rate regime
Source: See the appendix for data sources.
Note: The figure reports output per capita relative to period t – 2 in 100 log points for 
emerging market sudden stops, by exchange rate regime, together with Greece in 2010; 
10% one- sided,  point- wise confidence intervals for strict peggers.
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of maintaining a fixed exchange rate were small for either country. In-
stead, their decision to carry forward and adopt the euro can be related 
to historical and geostrategic reasons, in particular the desire to anchor 
their country firmly in the West. Both countries, therefore, adopted 
the euro despite the large  short- run costs associated with doing so: the 
comparison of their trajectory with Greece’s is unlikely to suffer from 
a strong selection bias. It is therefore interesting that the experience of 
Greece appears significantly worse than either country.22
Claim 4. The Greek crisis was significantly more severe than the typical emerg-
ing market sudden stop, even for countries such as Latvia or Estonia that main-
tained a fixed exchange rate in the aftermath of a sudden stop with large output 
collapse.
Figure 14 reports credit to the nonfinancial sector (left panel) and 
public debt (right panel), relative to output. The  credit- to- output ratio is 
measured in deviation from a  Hodrick- Prescott (HP) filter trend, while 
the debt- to- output ratio is measured relative to the country mean. Each 
Fig. 13. Output response for strict peggers
Source: See the appendix for data sources.
Note: The figure reports output per capita relative to period t – 2 in 100 log points for 
emerging market strict peggers, together with Estonia (2009), Latvia (2009), and Greece 
(2010); one- sided 10%  point- wise confidence intervals for strict peggers.
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Fig. 14. Credit and government debt 
Source: See the appendix for data sources.
Note: The left panel reports the ratio of credit to the nonfinancial sector to output, in 
deviation from a  Hodrick- Prescott trend, in percent of GDP. The right panel reports the 
ratio of government debt to output, in deviation from a country mean, in percent of GDP. 
Both panels report the typical response over each type of episode, together with Greece 
in 2010; one- sided 10%  point- wise confidence intervals for lending boom (top panel) and 
trifecta (bottom panel).
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variable is expressed in percent of GDP. The left panel reports 10% one- 
sided,  point- wise confidence bands for lending boom/bust episodes, 
while the right panel reports similar confidence bands for trifecta epi-
sodes, since these episodes witness the largest increase in public debt. 
Starting with the  credit- to- output ratio, we see that the initial leverage 
was high, but not as high as in typical lending boom episodes, around 
10% of GDP. The ratio of credit to GDP was gradually reduced, al-
though at a more measured pace than in typical episodes. Overall, the 
contraction in credit to the economy is similar to what is observed in 
other countries. Confidence bands are quite large.
Turning to public debt, we observe an elevated level of public debt even 
before the crisis (18% of GDP above mean in 2008), increasing rapidly and 
remaining significantly more elevated than in other episodes. We can see 
on the graph the effect of the 2012 debt restructuring (in t + 2), reducing 
the debt- to- output ratio from 80% to 60% of GDP above its mean, but fol-
lowed by a subsequent worsening, in part due to the collapse in economic 
activity in 2013 and 2014. Compared to trifecta or other episodes, levels of 
public debt remain extraordinarily high and it is clear from this figure that 
efforts to bring public debt back to sustainable levels have failed.
Claim 5. Domestic leverage in Greece was similar to other lending boom/
bust episodes and evolved similarly. By contrast, public debt to output re-
mained extremely elevated. Efforts to reduce the public debt burden mostly 
failed, despite a substantial debt restructuring in 2012.
Figure 15 reports the trade  balance- to- output ratio as well as the 
consumer price index (CPI)- based multilateral real exchange rate com-
piled by the IMF. As for domestic credit and public debt, the trade 
 balance- to- output ratio is measured in deviation from country means 
and expressed in percent of GDP. The multilateral real exchange rate is 
expressed in percentage deviation from its country mean. The figure also 
reports 10%  point- wise, one- sided confidence intervals for sudden stop 
episodes. The left panel (trade balance) illustrates the gradual but large 
improvement of the Greek trade balance between 2008 and 2014, in ex-
cess of 10% of GDP, compared to the typical sudden stop episode. Unlike 
typical sudden stops, where loss of market access forces the trade bal-
ance and current account to improve overnight, the overall improvement 
in Greece was spread out gradually. The cumulated improvement in the 
trade balance in a typical sudden stop represents 6.2% of output, 5% of 
which occurs in the year of the sudden stop itself. As discussed in the 
previous section, financial assistance and access to the liquidity facilities 
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Fig. 15. Net exports and real exchange rate
Source: See the appendix for data sources.
Note: The top panel reports the ratio of net exports on goods and services to output, in 
deviation from country mean, in percent of GDP. The bottom panel reports the multilat-
eral real exchange rate in percentage deviation from a country mean. Both panels report 
the typical response over each type of episode, together with Greece in 2010; one- sided, 
 point- wise confidence intervals for trifecta episodes.
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of the European Central Bank allowed Greece to spread out a massive 
and necessary adjustment in its trade balance. The right panel indicates 
that most of this adjustment occurred without major movements in the 
real exchange rate. Like other countries experiencing a sudden stop, 
Greece’s real exchange rate was initially overappreciated by about 13%. 
Yet, while the real exchange rate depreciates by 10% in the aftermath of 
a typical sudden stop (and a massive 35% following a trifecta), Greece’s 
real exchange rate only depreciated by 4.5% between 2008 and 2014.23
Claim 6. The adjustment of external balances occurred more gradually, but 
was nevertheless very significant in size. The improvement in external accounts 
occurred despite any significant movement in the real exchange rate.
IV. Model
This section presents a stylized model of a small open economy in a 
currency union with rich macrofinancial linkages. The model is de-
signed to shed light on two sets of issues. First, we want a realistic 
enough model that allows us to understand which shocks were respon-
sible for the performance of the Greek economy, both before and during 
the crisis. Second, we want to use the model to perform some simple 
counterfactual exercises. To achieve these objectives, the model needs to 
remain stylized. In particular, while we introduce many macrofinance 
features, we abstract from a full microfounded model of the banking 
sector that would put excessive constraints on the data. The model fea-
tures eight exogenous stochastic processes. They are labeled zs and each 
is assumed to follow an AR(1) process of the form:
 zti = rizt−1i + s i´ ti, (1)
where the persistence and volatility parameters (ri, si) are estimated 
from the data, and the innovations ´ti are i.i.d. with mean zero and unit 
variance, and i = {dg, spend, . .} is the name of the shock. We next specify 
the government, households, nonfinancial firms, and the financial sector.
A. Government
Budget Constraint
The government imposes a flat tax on income, spends Gt on goods and 
services, and makes social transfers Tt. Let B$,t−1
g  be the face value (in 
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units of the common currency) of the debt issued at time t – 1 and due 
at time t. The nominal budget constraint of the government, conditional 
on not defaulting, is
 B$,t
g
Rt
g + ttPH,tYt = PH,t Gt + Tt( ) + B$,t−1
g , (2)
where PH,t is the price index of home goods (so PH,tYt is nominal GDP), 
tt is a time- varying tax rate, and Rt
g is the gross interest rate on sover-
eign debt. It will be convenient to work with real variables. We define 
real government debt Bt
g ≡ B$,t
g / PH,t. We can then rewrite the budget 
constraint (conditional on not defaulting) as
 Bt
g
Rt
g + ttYt = Gt + Tt +
Bt−1
g
Pt
H
, (3)
where PtH ≡ PH,t / PH,t−1 is the domestic (i.e., PPI) inflation rate from t – 1 
to t. This formula makes clear that unexpected inflation at time t lowers 
the real debt burden. We use this convention for all other nominal 
assets.
Sovereign Default
Sovereign risk plays an important role in the Greek crisis.24 We do not 
model an optimal default decision by the government. Instead, we in-
troduce a default shock !´ tdg  and assume that the default happens when 
!´ tdg < F(Bt−1g / PtH ;Yt). We assume that the function F is increasing in the 
real debt burden Bt−1
g / PtH and decreasing in real GDP Yt. For instance, 
F could simply be the ratio of debt to GDP. The expected default rate is 
Et[ !dt+1] = Pr( !´ t+1dg < F(Btg / Pt+1H ;Yt+1)|It), where It is the information set 
of investors at time t. Notice that the distribution of !´ t+1dg  can be time 
varying. What matters most in our model, however, are expected credit 
losses, which take into account the probability of default and expected 
loss given default. Upon default, government debt is reduced by some 
haircut and we let dt
g denote expected credit losses. In our quantitative 
analysis, we adopt the following log- linear specification for expected 
credit losses at time t + 1:
 dt
g = dg
Bg
Y
(bt
g − Et[yt+1] − Et[pt+1h ] + ztdg), (4)
where Bg / Y is the average debt- to- GDP ratio, dg  is a sensitivity param-
eter, and lowercase variables (e.g., bt
g ) represent log deviations from 
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 steady- state values. The sovereign risk shock zt
dg follows an AR(1) as 
postulated in equation (1), with persistence rdg and volatility sdg. Equa-
tion (4) states that expected default losses increase with the level of 
debt, decrease with the inflation rate since the latter reduces the real 
debt burden, and increase with the sovereign default shock zt
dg. We will 
use data on sovereign yields to estimate the parameters {dg, rdg, sdg}. 
The rate paid by the government on its debt is then (in log deviations)
rt
g = rt + dt
g,
where rt is the international interest rate.
Fiscal Policy
The government’s spending policy and its social transfer policy are rep-
resented by the same rule
 gt = Flgt−1 − Fnnt − Frrt
g − Fbbt
g + zt
spend, (5)
where gt is the log deviation of spending, and nt, rt
g, and bt
g  are log devia-
tions of employment Nt, government credit risk spread Rt
g, and govern-
ment debt Bt
g from their  steady- state values, Fl, Fn, Fr, and Fb are fixed 
parameters, and zt
spend is a spending shock that follows equation (1) with 
persistence rspend and volatility sspend.25 We have the same rule for trans-
fers tt. We allow spending itself to be autoregressive (with Fl > 0) to cap-
ture the fact that government programs are often scheduled for several 
years. This fiscal rule implies that the fiscal authorities respond to an 
increase in sovereign debt by tightening expenditures and reducing so-
cial transfers. The term Fn captures automatic stabilizers: as the economy 
deteriorates, fiscal transfers and spending tends to increase. This formu-
lation allows government expenditures and transfers to change both be-
cause of macro and financial channels, and also because of spending 
shocks. Lastly, we specify the following process for the tax rate:
tt = t + zttax,
where ztax follows equation (1) with persistence rtax  and volatility stax 
and t is calibrated to the steady state.
B. Households
Household debt dynamics played an important role during the Great 
Recession, so we need to introduce borrowers and savers in the model. 
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Households are heterogeneous in their time preferences, as in Eggerts-
son and Krugman (2012) and Martin and Philippon (2014).26 There are 
two types of households: a measure 1 − x of patient households in-
dexed by i = s (who will be savers in equilibrium), and a measure x of 
impatient households indexed by i = b (who will be borrowers in equilib-
rium). These households have identical preferences over goods and 
hours worked, but differ in their discount factors: we assume that 
bs > bb. Household i maximizes expected lifetime utility
E0
t=0
∞
∑bit Ct
i( )1−g
1 − g
−
Nti( )
1+f
1 + w
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟ ,
where Cit is a bundle of home and foreign goods, defined in Gali and 
Monacelli (2008) by
Cti ≡ [(1 − √)1/ehCH,ti(eh−1)/eh + √1/ehCF,ti(eh−1)/eh]eh/(eh−1),
where eh is the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign 
goods and √ is the degree of openness of the economy. As usual, the 
home consumer price index (CPI) is
Pt ≡ [(1 − √)PH,t1−eh + √PF,t1−eh]1/(1−eh).
Household Default
Households borrow at the rate Rth and can default on their debts. Let dth 
be the credit loss rate on household loans. Default is a loss for the banks 
and a positive transfer to borrowers, similar to the financial shock de-
scribed in Iacoviello (2015). The borrowers’ budget constraint, following 
the same convention as with the government, is
 PtCtb = (1 − tt)WtNtb +
PH,tBth
Rth
− (1 − dth)PH,t−1Bt−1h + PH,tTtb. (6)
where (1 − tt)WtNtb denotes  after- tax labor income, Rth the gross interest 
rate faced by borrowers, Bth is the real face value of the household debt 
issued at t and due at t + 1, and Ttb the transfers received by borrowers. 
Borrowers are subject to the following borrowing limit:
Bth <
Bth
x
.
In our notations, Bth is a per capita measure, while Bth denotes the aggre-
gate lending capacity of the financial sector to households. We later de-
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rive this lending limit from the lender’s problem, and we anticipate the 
result that only impatient households borrow in equilibrium. The credit 
loss rate is assumed to follow the process:
 dth = −dhyyt + dhbbth + ztdh, (7)
where ztdh follows equation (1) with persistence r
dh and volatility sdh. 
Equation (7) states that the credit loss rate on household loans increases 
with their debt level, decreases with output, and increases with a house-
hold default shock zdh. We will use data on nonperforming loans to esti-
mate {dhy, dhb, rdh, sdh}. Note that dth are realized credit losses at time t, un-
like dt
g, which is an expected loss that may or may not materialize at t + 1.
The savers’ budget constraint is
 PtCts = (1 − tt)WtNts + !RtPH,t−1St−1 − PH,tSt + PH,tTts, (8)
where !Rt  is the nominal  after- tax gross return on savings PH,t–1St–1 at 
time t and Tts denotes real transfers to savers. This return is a complex 
object since savers are residual claimants: in equilibrium, they hold 
shares of firms and of banks, but also deposits, government bonds, and 
potentially foreign assets. Notice, however, that in equation (3) we have 
assumed a uniform tax rate on aggregate income, and this is what mat-
ters in the end. The savers’ Euler equation is
Et b
Ct+1s
Cts
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
−g !Rt+1
Pt+1
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥ = 1,
where Pt+1 = Pt+1 / Pt denotes the gross CPI inflation rate from t to t + 
1. Finally, in the aggregate, we have
CH,t = xCH,tb + (1 − x)CH,ts
Ct = xCtb + (1 − x)Cts.
Nominal Wage Rigidity
We assume a standard model of wage stickiness with a representative 
union setting wages à la Calvo. The wage equations are standard and 
satisfy:
pt
w = bEtpt+1w − lw(wt − gct − wnt) + ztw,
pt = (1 − √)pth + √pt
f ,
wt = wt−1 + ptw − pth,
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where ptw  denotes wage inflation, wt is the real wage in terms of the CPI 
(ln(Wt / Pt)), ztw is a wage- markup shock that follows equation (1) with 
persistence rw and volatility sw; pt denotes CPI inflation, pth is home 
inflation, pt
f  is foreign inflation, and lw is derived from the Calvo wage- 
setting process. The first equation is a  forward- looking wage Phillips 
curve. Wage inflation depends on expected future wage inflation, on 
the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure, and 
on the wage- markup shock zw.
C. Nonfinancial Firms
We separate firms into  goods- producing and  capital- producing firms in 
order to simplify the derivation of the  price- setting equation on the one 
hand, and the investment/Q equation on the other hand.
Capital- Producing Firms
Capital firms convert consumption goods into capital through invest-
ment and rent this capital to  goods- producing firms for a rental rate Zk,t. 
The capital stock evolves according to
 Kt = (1 − d)Kt−1 + It, (9)
and real period profits (i.e., scaled by PH,t) for these firms are given by
Divt = Zk,tKt−1 − It −
wk
2
Kt−1
It
Kt−1
− d
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
2
,
where the last term captures adjustment costs to physical capital. Let Rtk 
be the firm’s funding cost. The real value of  capital- producing firms is 
V(Kt–1) and satisfies the following Bellman equation
 V(Kt−1) = maxIt,Kt
Zk,tKt−1 − It −
wk
2
Kt−1
It
Kt−1
− d
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
2
+ Et
PH,t+1
Rtk
V(Kt)
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
⎧
⎨
⎪
⎩⎪
⎫
⎬
⎪
⎭⎪
subject to equation (9).
Let xt ≡ (Kt − Kt−1) / Kt−1 be the net investment rate. Given our ho-
motheticity assumptions, we guess and verify that the value function 
can be written as
V Kt−1( ) = VtKt−1,
where
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 Vt = maxxt
Zk,t − xt − d −
wk
2
xt2 + 1 + xt( ) Et
PH,t+1
Rtk
Vt+1
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
⎧
⎨
⎩
⎫
⎬
⎭
. (10)
Define Tobin’s Q as the end- of- period value of assets divided by the 
end- of- period replacement cost of capital
 Qt ≡ Et
PH,t+1
Rtk
Vt+1
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
. (11)
Optimal investment yields the standard Q- equation:
 xt =
Qt − 1
wk
. (12)
Goods- Producing Firms
Goods- producing firms produce differentiated varieties of a domestic 
good using capital and labor. The production function for a producer 
of good j is
Yt( j) = AKt( j)aNt( j)1−a,
where A is aggregate total factor productivity (TFP). We focus here on 
the case where TFP is constant because the model is simpler to present 
and fits the data quite well. Goods- producing firms are subject to a fi-
nancial friction that requires them to pay part of their operating costs in 
advance, before production is undertaken, as in Christiano, Eichen-
baum, and Evans (2005) or Jermann and Quadrini (2012).27 Let csk de-
note the fraction of input cost that needs to be financed by working 
capital loans. Profits are given by
Profitst = Revenuest − Costst[1 + csk(Rtk − 1)].
Standard cost minimization yields an expression for the nominal mar-
ginal cost,
MCt$ =
[1 + csk(Rtk − 1)]
A
PH,tZk,t
a( )
a Wt
1 − a( )
1−a
.
Notice that the  working- capital friction can be represented by an incre-
mental marginal cost for the firm. This will be an important property, as 
it allows financial frictions to pass through to inflation. Differentiated 
goods producers solve a standard Calvo problem, given factor de-
mands. Given real marginal cost MCt ≡ MCt$ / PH,t, we can write the 
(log- linear) Phillips curve as
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ph,t = lpmct + bEtph,t+1 + ztph,
where lp is derived from the Calvo  price- setting process, b is the dis-
count factor of savers, and the (log) real marginal cost is
mct =
cskRk
1 + csk(Rk − 1)
rtk + azk,t + (1 − a)(wt + √tott);
zt
ph  is an AR(1) price markup shock that satisfies equation (1) with 
persistence rph and volatility sph. Notice that marginal costs are de-
flated in terms of the price of home- produced goods, hence the 
 terms- of- trade adjustment for the real wage, which reflects the term 
Pt / PH,t. Finally, we have the usual static optimality condition for la-
bor demand:
Kt−1
Nt
= a
1 − a
Wt
PH,tZk,t
.
D. Banks, Sudden Stop, and Funding Cost
A fully specified model of banking intermediation as in Gertler and 
Kiyo taki (2010) is beyond the scope of this paper. Moreover, the  financial- 
sector data necessary to estimate the restrictions of such a model, such 
as the balance sheet of banks and its components, are not available (see 
Faria- e- Castro [2016] for a more ambitious estimation). There is, how-
ever, one fundamental insight from the models of banking intermedia-
tion that is theoretically straightforward and, as we show later, em-
pirically relevant. At the heart of many banking models is a capital 
requirement of the type
 Vtbank ≥ k
Btk
Rtk
+ Bt
h
Rth
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟, (13)
where Vtbank  is the franchise value of the banking sector and Btk and Bth 
denote the outstanding loans to the corporate nonfinancial and house-
hold sectors, respectively, both measured at the end of period t. This 
equation assumes that there is no capital requirement for sovereign ex-
posure, as was the case in Europe at the time. Equation (13) says that 
bank equity Vtbank  must cover a fraction k of the total credit exposure to 
firms and to households. The second important equation is the current 
account of the banking sector:
 PH,t+1Et+1 = (1 − dt+1k )Btk + (1 − dt+1h )Bth − Dt . (14)
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Equation (14) states that nominal bank earnings PH,t+1Et+1 consist of re-
payment from firms and households net of default losses, minus the 
repayment of banks’ liabilities Dt. Finally, bank value solves a Bellman 
equation
 Vtbank = maxBt{ },Dt
Divt + Et
Lt+1
Pt+1
PH,t+1((1 − s)Et+1 + sVt+1bank)
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
, (15)
where s is an exogenous exit rate, Lt+1 is the pricing kernel of savers, 
and dividends Divt are assumed to be a fixed fraction of earnings Et. 
This captures the assumption that banks cannot raise equity very 
quickly, and it implies that capital losses lead to tighter lending con-
straints, as least in the short run.
Equations (13), (14), and (15) capture the fundamental credit channel 
in the economy. Credit losses reduce banks’ earnings in equation (14), 
lower bank value in equation (15), and tighten capital requirement in 
equation (13). This leads to an increase in the economy’s funding cost. 
All else equal, this channel is stronger the higher the bank leverage. We 
capture this idea in two steps. First, we model the banks’ (log) funding 
cost rtd as
rtd = rt + ztr + jdLEt[dt+1p ],
where L is bank leverage (assets over equity capital) in steady state, jd 
is a sensitivity parameter to be estimated, dt+1
p  measures losses on private 
credit portfolio (households and firms’ loans), and ztr is a sudden stop 
shock that increases funding costs to banks; zr satisfies equation (1) with 
persistence rr and volatility sr. Since we only have data on total nonper-
forming loans, we will assume that loss rates on households’ and firms’ 
credit are identical: dth = dtk ≡ dt
p.
Second, we assume that banks’ funding costs are passed on to banks’ 
customers (with a constant margin that drops out in logs), therefore
rtk = rtd.
Note that in our notations above, rtk  is the funding cost of firms, which 
enters directly the Q equations (10) and (11). For households, we had 
defined rth as the interest rate on loans, gross of expected losses, that 
enters the budget constraint (6). If we were to quote an interest rate for 
corporate loans, it would be rtd + Et[dt+1k ], and the expected return would 
be rtd. With our assumptions, the sudden stop shock is an increase in the 
country’s funding cost above and beyond what can be explained by 
domestic intermediation spreads.
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E. Equilibrium
All transactions with the rest of the world happen at rate Rt. Let NFAt 
denote the net foreign assets of the country (in units of domestic goods). 
By definition, NFA evolves as
NFAt
Rt
= NFAt−1 − PtCt + PH,t Yt − Gt − It −
wk
2
Kt−1
Kt
Kt−1
− 1
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
2⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟.
As is common in the literature, we make a technical assumption to en-
sure stationarity of NFA.28 We assume that there is a (small) price im-
pact of NFA on the country’s borrowing (or saving) rate
∂logRt
∂logNFAt
= −er,
where er  is a small but strictly positive number. Clearing in the market 
for domestic goods requires
Yt = CHt +
PHt
PtF
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
−e f
CtF + Gt + It +
wk
2
Kt−1
Kt
Kt−1
− 1
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟
2
,
where CtF represents aggregate foreign consumption and PtF the foreign 
CPI; e f  is the demand elasticity.
Household Debt
Banks lend to domestic households. We assume that borrowers are im-
patient enough to hit their borrowing limits, so
xBth = Bth.
The basic model does not pin down a unique borrowing rate Rth. 
As long as Rth > Rtd , banks are willing to lend more. As long as 
bbEt[(Rth / Pt+1)uʹ(ct+1)] < uʹ(ct) borrowers want to borrow more. In steady 
state, any Rh ∈ (bs−1,bb−1) is potentially an equilibrium.29 This issue is 
present in and out of steady state. For the steady state, however, a rea-
sonable assumption is that the lending spread is pinned down by free 
entry into banking. We will directly calibrate the  steady- state spread 
Dt ≡ Rth / Rt using empirical studies of financial intermediation: Philip-
pon (2012) shows that the spread is remarkably stable in the long run at 
D = 1.02. Out of steady state, we expect both loan supply and loan de-
mand to decrease in response to an increase in banks’ funding cost, so 
we specify in log deviations from  steady- state values
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 bth = cbhbt−1h − jbhrtd + ztbh, (16)
where ztbh is an AR(1) shock that satisfies equation (1) with persistence 
rbh and volatility sbh.
Interest Rates and Funding Costs in the Model
There are four interest rates in the model, so it is useful to summarize 
them here. First of all, there is the baseline interest rate rt that enters the 
NFA and the Euler equation of savers. Above and beyond this rate there 
are spreads and expected losses, so that
rtd = rt + ztr + jdLEt dt+1p[ ]
dt
p = −dyyt + dbbt−1 + zt
def
rtk = rtd
rth = rtd + Et dt+1p[ ]
rt
g = rt + dt
g
dt
g = dg
Bg
Y
bt
g − Et yt+1[ ] − Et pt+1h[ ] + ztdg( )
.
Notice our assumptions here. First, domestic savers do not earn higher 
expected returns when there is a sudden stop. They earn r, which re-
mains essentially constant and equal to the rate in the Eurozone. Sec-
ond, the banks are sensitive to the sudden stop and to credit losses. The 
sudden stop ztr enters the economy via the banks, which then pass it on 
to their customers. Nonperforming loans dt+1
p  hurt banks and increase 
the funding costs of all private agents. We only have data on total non-
performing loans, so we do not model separately firm and household 
defaults. We assume that they move together and we estimate only one 
equation for dt
p. The shock zt
def  captures the evolution of NPLs that is not 
predicted by macroeconomic fundamentals.
Fourth, the government is not necessarily affected by the same sud-
den stop as the private sector. The shock zt
dg raises the cost of funds for 
the government. It captures pessimism by investors about the credit-
worthiness of the government, whether or not this pessimism is borne 
out in equilibrium. There are many reasons why zt
dg and ztr are different, 
but let us just mention two. First, as we discussed, the ECB provided 
funding to Greek banks both directly and indirectly via emergency li-
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quidity assistance, insulating them from sovereign risk, in particular 
during the sovereign debt restructuring. Second, government debt is 
now largely held by official creditors, rather than domestic banks, at-
tenuating the link between sovereign and banking risks.
Finally, while the two shocks zrand zdg are conceptually distinct, the 
model features important feedback loops between the sovereign and 
the banks. This “doom loop” has been extensively discussed in policy 
circles and analyzed in stylized models (see Brunnermeier et al. 2016; 
Farhi and Tirole 2016). The impact of banks on the sovereign is always 
present via general equilibrium effects and tax revenues. If banks expe-
rience a sudden stop, the economy contracts and credit risk, both 
private and sovereign, increases. Conversely, if sovereign risk increases, 
the worsening of economic outcomes increases default in the private 
sector, affecting bank values. Hence, our model features rich and com-
plex interactions between the financial and public sectors.
V. Estimation
In this section, we describe the estimation of the model. We combine 
the Kalman Filter with Bayesian techniques, which allow us to recover 
estimates for the structural shocks that affected Greece during the first 
decade of the  twenty- first century. These estimated shocks can then be 
used to conduct counterfactual exercises.
A. Data, Observables, and Calibration
The sample is annual, from 1999 to 2015. Figure 16 shows the eight 
series that we feed into the model, all measured in log deviations from 
steady state. For interest rates and inflation, we also take the difference 
from the Eurozone average series.
The model features as many shocks as observables, which are de-
scribed in table 4.30 In addition, we allow for measurement error to do-
mestic inflation, wage inflation, and the measure of nonperforming 
loans since these variables are quite noisy and/or measured impre-
cisely. Specifically, we assume that we observe !xt, where
!xt = xt + ´terror
and ´ terror  is a measurement error term.31 For household debt, we take as 
a proxy the series for total credit to the private nonfinancial sector for 
Greece.
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We estimate the remaining “dynamic” parameters using standard 
Bayesian estimation techniques following An and Schorfheide (2007).32 
We estimate a total of 25 parameters: the persistence and volatility of 
the eight structural shocks, the variance of the three measurement er-
rors, as well as six other dynamic parameters: the elasticity of expected 
Fig. 16. Observables: Filtered data
Note: All series are in log deviations from steady state. Interest rates and inflation rates 
are also in deviation from the Eurozone average. The NPL, GDP deflator, and wages are 
assumed to be measured with errors.
Table 4
Observables and Shocks
Observable Description  Shock Shock Description
Gt + Tt Government spending zt
spend Govt. spending shock
ttYt Government revenues zttax Tax rate shock
Rt
g  Greek government spread over  
EZ average
zt
dg  Sovereign risk shock 
Rtk SME spread over EZ average ztr Funding cost shock
exp(dt
p) Nonperforming loans/total loans, 
def = npl
zdef  Private default shock 
Pt Greece CPI – EZ CPI zph PPI cost push shock
Bth Household debt ztbh Household credit shock
Pt
w 
  
Greek wage inflation – EZ wage  
inflation  
zw 
 
Wage inflation shock 
Note: We use a combination of calibration and estimation. We calibrate parameters 
that affect  steady- state variables. Most of the calibrated parameters take standard 
values for small open economies and are reported in tables A5, A6, and A7 in the ap-
pendix.
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sovereign default losses with respect to debt to GDP, the elasticities of 
private default with respect to GDP and debt, the persistence of the 
household credit equation, the elasticity of household credit with re-
spect to the cost of funds, and the pass- through of future default to 
current lending rates. The estimation results, along with our choice of 
priors, are described in table A9 in the appendix.
B. Results
Smoothed Variables
The smoothed shocks are reported in figure A2 in the appendix. We also 
use the Kalman Filter to extract the sequences implied by the model for 
the remaining endogenous variables. This provides a good way of gaug-
ing the fit of the model. We present the most important series in figure 17, 
Fig. 17. Smoothed variables
Note: The figure reports the model estimated values of output, investment, inflation 
(price and wage), and next  exports- to- GDP ratio. Both inflation series are part of the esti-
mation, but are assumed to be measured with error.
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where we plot the data and  model- implied paths for GDP, corporate in-
vestment, PPI inflation, and current  account- to- GDP ratio.
The main point to take away from figure 17 is that the model’s pre-
dictions for output and investment are good, even though we did not 
use any data on output or investment in the estimation. This means 
that our fiscal and financial multipliers are consistent with the data. For 
domestic price inflation, whose measurement is imperfect, we plot the 
observed raw data series against the  model- based series that filters out 
the noise.33 For wage inflation, on the other hand, measurement errors 
appear small.
Figures 18–21 are the first main findings of the model. In each case, 
the black line is the smoothed value of the corresponding endogenous 
variable, in percent deviations from steady state. Each bar represents 
the contribution of a corresponding shock and its lagged values to the 
predicted value of the corresponding variable at each point in time.34
GDP
The GDP series in figure 18 shows how our model interprets the Greek 
crisis. Around 2000, credit demand is high and credit risk is low, so 
households borrow and consume. During that period, government 
spending increases more than predicted by our fiscal rule, as captured 
by the positive spending shocks. This is the same finding as in Martin 
and Philippon (2014). This massive fiscal expansion explains most of 
the output gap, which is around +15% in 2007. The recessionary shocks 
arrive in sequence. The model finds that the sudden stop starts in 2009 
and remains very significant until 2013, depressing output by 5% to 
10%. It is important to keep in mind that this is a decomposition with 
respect to shocks, not propagation mechanisms. For example, the sud-
den stop shock appears first in the funding cost of the private sector, 
but its effects propagate via several mechanisms: lower credit, lower 
demand, more private and sovereign default risk, and so forth. The ef-
fect of all of these mechanisms is aggregated into the bar corresponding 
to the sudden stop shock (right- slanted dashed line).
Role of Government Spending
It is important to understand how exactly the model interprets fiscal 
policy shocks. We feed in actual government spending in our calibra-
tion, and since the model implies significant fiscal multipliers (around 
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1.5), fiscal dynamics “accounts” for much of GDP dynamics. But that is 
not how the model computes the contribution of each shock. The model 
seeks to understand why government spending moves using the fiscal 
rule (5). Government default risk increases in 2011 and especially in 
2012, the year of the sovereign default. From 2010 to 2012, there is no au-
tonomous negative spending shock. In other words, the observed path 
of government spending can be explained by our fiscal rule, given the 
increase in funding costs.35 In reality, spending was largely determined 
by official financing. Under the 2010 program, the Greek government 
received 110 billion euros. Another 130 billion euros became available as 
part of the 2012 program and debt restructuring. What the model says 
is that the size of the program (and the implied path of spending and 
taxes) was consistent with a fiscal rule such as equation (5).
Autonomous (negative) spending shocks emerge in 2013, and to a 
lesser extent in 2014, because sovereign spreads decrease and spending 
does not increase (or even decreases). This coincides with the imple-
mentation of the 2012 IMF and Eurogroup program.
Figure 19 reports the decomposition for government debt (left panel) 
and its yield (right panel). Both variables are part of the estimation. 
We see that the accumulation of government debt is mostly the conse-
quence of past spending decisions. Fiscal expansions do not increase 
debt much in the short run because GDP and revenues increase. In the 
long run, however, they increase debt. The debt accumulation after the 
crisis in figure 19 is mostly due to spending shocks that happened before 
the crisis. The yield on sovereign debt is also mostly affected by the 
fiscal shock, and also by sovereign risk. We observe a sharp decline in 
sovereign risk following the 2012 debt restructuring.
Markups and Nonperforming Loans
Finally, starting in 2013, two important factors dragging down the 
Greek economy are the rise in nonperforming loans and the increase 
in price markups. As in Agatha Christie’s Murder on the Orient Express, 
the boom and bust in Greek output per capita cannot be attributed to 
a single cause: over time, different shocks played a role. This decom-
position also indicates that, by 2015, the external drags on the Greek 
economy due to the sudden stop and the sovereign debt crisis have sub-
sided. What remains are mostly domestic factors: some fiscal austerity, 
mounting losses on private loans, and the relative lack of adjustment in 
Greek prices relative to wages.
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Investment (figure 18, right panel) is mostly affected by the increase 
in funding costs due to the sudden stop in 2009–2013. In 2014 and 2015, 
investment remains subdued largely because of  private- sector credit 
risk, fiscal austerity, and especially price markup shocks.
Figure 20 reports both expected private defaults (left panel) and the 
funding cost of the private sector (right panel). Both variables are also 
perfectly predicted by the model, by construction. Private credit losses 
were low early in the sample because of low private default risk and the 
strong stimulus coming from government spending. After 2007, private 
credit losses mount rapidly, mostly as a consequence of macrodynam-
ics. The increase in funding costs due to the sudden stop, the collapse in 
credit demand, fiscal austerity, and the increase in private default risk all 
contribute to raise private credit losses. The right panel illustrates that 
the main driver of private sector cost of funds was the sudden stop.36
Figure 21 reports government spending (left panel) and revenues 
(right panel). Government spending is largely autonomous in the 
boom, a finding consistent with Martin and Philippon (2014). In the 
bust, it is explained by the funding constraint, and then by restrictions 
consistent with the IMF/Eurogroup program. Government revenues 
are dominated by macrodynamics. While tax shocks move from nega-
tive to positive, revenues decline overall due to the sudden stop and its 
effect on output and investment, the impact of spending cuts on output, 
and mounting nonperforming loans.
Finally, figure 22 decomposes domestic price (left panel) and wage 
inflation (right panel). Fiscal austerity, private sector default, and wage 
compression (negative wage markup shocks) contribute to deflationary 
price and wages forces. Yet wage adjustment is significantly larger than 
price adjustment, and the difference can largely be attributed to price 
markup shocks zph.
C. Impulse Responses
We next explore the internal mechanics of the model by plotting some 
impulse response functions, estimated at the posterior mean of the pa-
rameters. Each impulse response reports the effect of a one standard 
deviation shock on the variables of the model, expressed in percent 
deviation from their steady state. We present here only a few impulse 
responses. Other figures are in the appendix.
Figure 23 shows the response to a transfer shock, ´ t
spend. Our model is not 
Ricardian. An increase in government spending raises the consumption 
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of borrowers, as well as output, employment, investment, and inflation. 
As the economy expands, nonperforming loans decline. Over time, 
public debt gradually increases, which pushes up sovereign yields. The 
model thus features a significant but temporary effect of a fiscal expan-
sion on output, and a long- lasting effect on the level of public debt.
Figure 24 shows the response to a sovereign risk shock, ´ t
dg . The fiscal 
rule forces a cut in spending that leads to a drop in output, employ-
ment, and inflation. The decline in output increases private credit risk, 
which feeds back into funding costs and curtails investment. Figure 24 
(and figure A3 in the appendix, which looks at the response to a private 
default shock) illustrates the sovereign/bank interactions: as sovereign 
risk increases, the funding costs of the private sector are affected. Con-
versely, as private default risk increases, sovereign risk increases as 
well. In our model, these effects work via general equilibrium effects.
Finally, figure 25 shows the response to a sudden stop, ´ r . An increase 
in the country’s funding cost causes corporate investment to decline. 
Impatient household debt declines as well, and so does borrower con-
sumption. The decline in consumption and investment drives output, 
employment, and inflation down. The interest rate on government debt 
increases because the decline in economic activity heightens sovereign 
risks.
VI. Counterfactuals
In this section, we run five counterfactual exercises. To understand our 
counterfactual exercises, let yit denote the observation of variable i at 
date t, and let xˆit denote the smoothed value for variable i at date t. Let 
xˆiT ≡ {xˆi,t}t=0T  denote the estimated smoothed sequence for variable i in 
our sample period for t = 0, . . . ,T and denote xˆT  the sequence of all 
smoothed variables: xˆT ≡ {xˆiT}. Every estimated sequence can be written 
as a mapping G(.) from the estimated parameters Qˆ and the sequences 
of smoothed shocks, {ˆ´ kT}k=1K ≡ {ˆ´ k,t}k=1,t=0K,T , where K is the number of 
shocks in our model:
xˆT = G(Qˆ, {ˆ´ kT}k=1K ).
A counterfactual exercise consists in postulating an alternate choice for 
Qˆ and {ˆ´ kT}k=1K  , denoted !Q and {!´ kT}k=1K  and then compute the counterfac-
tual !xT  as:
!xT = G( !Q, {!´ kT}k=1K ).
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Based on the empirical analysis of section III and the analytical results 
of section V, we begin with a “low leverage” counterfactual. In that ex-
ercise, we ask what would have happened, through the lens of our 
model, if Greece’s external and internal leverage had been similar to 
that of  emerging- market economies about to experience a sudden stop. 
This counterfactual is motivated by the evidence from section III that 
documents the severity and persistence of the Greek crisis when com-
pared to many other—especially  emerging- market economies—crises. 
In our second counterfactual we ask: What would Greece have looked 
like without a “sudden stop” for private capital? Setting ´ tr = 0 for all t 
represents the situation that would have prevailed with a well- 
functioning European Banking Union.37 The third counterfactual asks 
what would have happened if Greece had maintained fiscal discipline 
before 2007. In that counterfactual, we set ´ t
spend = 0 for all t. The fourth 
counterfactual explores the role of price markups and sets ´tph = 0 for 
all t. This is an important exercise, since the analytical decomposition of 
section V indicates that price markup shocks are an important drag on 
output and investment in 2014 and 2015. Our last counterfactual con-
siders the role of price and wage stickiness in the adjustment path of 
Greece. As discussed in section III, other countries such as Latvia or 
Estonia that maintained their peg in the face of a sudden stop and out-
put collapse experienced a much faster recovery. We ask how much a 
lack of price flexibility may be responsible for this outcome. To do this, 
we reduce the calibrated price stickiness parameters lp and lw while 
keeping the sequence of shocks unchanged.
A. Low Leverage Economy
For our first counterfactual exercise, we calibrate the Greek economy to 
the level of government, private, and banking leverage observed in the 
typical  emerging- market economy just prior to a sudden stop.
Table 5 compares the leverage of Greece to the leverage of other EMs 
that have experienced a sudden stop as described in section III. It is 
clear that leverage is much higher in Greece along all dimensions, and 
in particular with respect to sovereign debt. Typically, leverage in EMs 
prior to sudden stops is roughly half of that of Greece prior to the 2010 
crisis. Accordingly, we reduce Bh / Y, Bg / Y, G / Y, T / Y, and bank le-
verage at the steady state by half. With these alternate parameters !Q, 
and the same sequence of smoothed shocks {ˆ´ kT}k=1K , we recompute the 
path of the endogenous variables, !xT .
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Figure 26 reports the path for the actual data (solid line), the 
smoothed original estimates (tightly dotted line) and the coun-
terfactual (dotted line). In this counterfactual, Greece would have 
been much more constrained in the  build- up phase of the crisis. The 
smaller size of its government sector would have prevented it from 
excessively stimulating its economy, reducing the output gap from 
+14.1% in 2007 in the smoothed estimates to +9.2% (top- left panel). 
Once the fiscal contraction, sudden stop, and sovereign risk materi-
Fig. 26. Counterfactual: Low leverage
Note: The figure reports the counterfactual when we set the government, private and 
banking leverage to the value for EM economies prior to a sudden stop.
Table 5
Leverage and Imbalances before Sudden Stop
  Greece  Typical EME  Min.  Max.
Credit/GDP 1.01 0.46 0.025 1.46
Sovereign debt/GDP 1.38 0.343 0.063 0.68
Current account/GDP –0.083  –0.039  –0.10  +0.17
Note: Average from t – 6 to t – 2 where t is the year of the sudden stop. Credit refers to 
domestic credit to nonfinancial institutions.
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alize, we find that they would have had a substantially more muted 
impact on the economy. For instance, the peak- to- trough decline in 
output is now only 22% instead of 33%. The decline in investment is 
also more muted, around 64% instead of 77%. Hence, some of the ex-
cess drop in investment observed in figure 9 can be attributed to the 
exceptional leverage of the Greek economy relative to other emerging 
economies. Were it not for its elevated exposure levels, Greece would 
have experienced a more typical emerging market trifecta crisis. Sim-
ilarly, limited external exposure would have reduced the build up in 
external deficits, to –6.7% of GDP instead of –8.6%, and consequently 
imposed a smaller turnaround in the current account (+8% instead 
of +12.7%).
B. No Sudden Stop Shocks
For our second counterfactual exercise, we keep our vector of estimated 
and calibrated parameters fixed, Qˆ, and we recompute !xT  based on a 
new sequence of smoothed shocks. This new sequence is identical to the 
one that we estimated, with the exception that we set the private sud-
den stop shock to zero, ˆ´ tr = 0. Figure 27 reports the results with the 
same convention as the previous counterfactual.
The absence of a private sudden stop can be interpreted as the 
outcome in presence of a well- functioning banking union. With a 
 European- level resolution and supervision authority, foreign and do-
mestic creditors would have no incentive to run. The counterfactual 
reveals that a banking union would have had almost no impact on the 
path of output during the build up (figure 27, top- left panel). Recall 
that the path for output prior to 2007 was largely driven by high credit 
demand, as well as by the stimulative effect of expansionary fiscal poli-
cies. The eventual consolidation of fiscal accounts was unavoidable, 
with or without a private sudden stop. In other words, a banking union 
would not have insulated Greece from the consequences of its past un-
sustainable fiscal policies. However, the sudden stop did contribute to 
worsen the output response once the crisis got under way. By 2013, 
we find that output would have been higher by 9 percentage points in 
the absence of sudden stop, although the difference would have subse-
quently declined. Much of the effect of the sudden stop was on invest-
ment (top- right panel), which would have been higher by 33 percentage 
points otherwise in 2013.
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C. Fiscal Discipline
As mentioned already many times, it is perhaps not entirely surprising 
that Greece would experience a serious downturn given the size of the 
needed fiscal consolidation. What would have happened if, instead, 
Greece had followed a virtuous fiscal path since 2000? We consider this 
counterfactual by setting !´ tspend = 0, that is, assuming away both the fiscal 
excesses of the 2000–2007 period and the subsequent required fiscal con-
solidation. Figure 28 reports the results. Not surprisingly, the crisis would 
have been much more muted, especially for output, government spend-
ing, and net exports. Output (top- left panel) would have declined by 
around 16% instead of 33% between 2007 and 2013. Government spending 
(bottom- right panel) would have barely increased between 2000 and 2010, 
then declined a modest 8% instead of 34% relative to steady state. Finally, 
the current account would have started to improve as early as 2006.38
Fig. 27. Counterfactual: No private sudden stop
Note: The figure reports the counterfactual when we set the private sudden stop 
shock !´ tr = 0.
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D. No Markup Shocks
Next, we consider the relative contribution of price markup shocks by 
studying the paths of the variables of the model while turning shocks 
to domestic inflation ˆ´ tph = 0.
Figure 29 reports the results. The figure suggests that price markup 
shocks play an important role in the analysis. Perhaps surprisingly, in 
the absence of price markup shocks Greece would have experienced no 
boom (top- left panel), but a bust of a similar magnitude. Most impor-
tantly, this counterfactual reveals that the increase in price markups has 
become a significant force hindering the recovery of the Greek econ-
omy: without markup shocks, investment would have recovered to 18% 
of its  steady- state value (top- right panel) by 2015, while output would 
have rebounded by 11% of its  steady- state value since the trough. Inter-
estingly, lower markups would translate into stronger deflation, which 
would have adversely affected government debt dynamics, triggering 
further declines in government spending (bottom- right panel). We infer 
Fig. 28. Counterfactual: Fiscal discipline
Note: The figure reports the counterfactual when we set the spending shocks !´ tspend = 0.
This content downloaded from 158.143.197.030 on June 27, 2017 04:08:23 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
The Analytics of the Greek Crisis 63
from this counterfactual analysis that price dynamics are crucial to the 
recovery of the Greek economy. Recall that in our model, marginal costs 
include a financial component due to working capital. The increase in 
 price- marginal costs markups cannot, therefore, be attributed to an in-
crease in financial frictions that raise the nonwage components of the 
marginal costs. Instead, our estimates indicate that lack of entry and 
competition in product markets, as well as a rise in firms’ costs stem-
ming from factors such as the uncertainty about EZ exit and higher 
taxes on key inputs, may be responsible for a very sluggish recovery.
E. Latvia: Low Price Stickiness
Our final counterfactual aims to explore the role of price and wage ri-
gidities more closely. Ideally, one would like to analyze how the Greek 
economy would have performed had it left the euro and been able to 
depreciate its own currency. Yet this is not a counterfactual that we can 
easily analyze, at least without auxiliary assumptions. For instance, un-
Fig. 29. Counterfactual: No domestic price markup shocks
Note: The figure reports the counterfactual when we set price markup shocks !´ tph = 0.
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der a “Grexit” scenario, one needs to specify what would happen to 
euro- denominated liabilities. Instead, we ask the converse—and eas-
ier—question: What would have happened if prices had been more 
flexible in Greece? In the limit where prices are perfectly flexible, the 
nominal exchange rate regime becomes irrelevant. It is well known also 
that price and wage flexibility may work perversely, aggravating Fish-
erian debt- deflation dynamics either at the zero lower bound, or under 
a fixed exchange rate. Nevertheless, the evidence of Latvia and Estonia 
discussed in section III suggests that countries with more flexible wages 
and prices may experience shorter recessions. To investigate these ques-
tions, we keep the sequence of shocks fixed and reduce the calibrated 
price stickiness parameters, lp and lw, to half of their original values.
Figure 30 reports the results. The figure indicates that Greece would 
have avoided a significant share of the boom/bust cycle with a peak- 
to- trough decline in output of 20% instead of 33%. Similarly, invest-
ment would have declined by only 55% instead of 77%. The recovery in 
output would also have been sharper with output 8 percentage points 
Fig. 30. Counterfactual: Low price stickiness
Note: The figure reports the counterfactual when we set wage and price stickiness lp  and 
lw to half their calibrated values.
This content downloaded from 158.143.197.030 on June 27, 2017 04:08:23 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
The Analytics of the Greek Crisis 65
above the baseline estimates in 2015. We conclude that faster price and 
wage adjustment would have dampened the boom/bust cycle and ac-
celerated the recovery.
VII. Conclusion
In this paper we analyze the macroeconomic dynamics of Greece before 
and during the crisis that it has been experiencing since 2008. This is only 
an interim report since, six years down the road, the crisis is still playing 
out and the Greek economy is still very much on life support. Never-
theless, we believe that enough time has elapsed to make it possible to 
provide preliminary answers. We put Greek macroeconomic dynamics 
in perspective by comparing with crisis episodes in other countries, in-
cluding sudden stops, sovereign defaults, lending booms and busts, and 
combinations of the above. We also interpret Greece’s crisis dynamics 
through the lens of a DSGE model that incorporates key features of the 
crisis such as sovereign default and financial frictions. Using the model, 
we decompose the movements of macroeconomic variables such as out-
put and investment into the contributions of different types of shocks, 
including fiscal shocks and shocks to the financial sector. We also perform 
counterfactuals to examine how factors such as debt levels, fiscal policy, 
and price rigidities may have contributed to the severity of the crisis.
Our main findings are as follows. First, Greece’s drop in output was 
significantly more severe and protracted than in the average crisis episode. 
Second, the unusually large drop in output was accompanied by an un-
usually large drop in the  investment- to- output ratio. Third, much of the 
discrepancy can be accounted for by the higher levels of debt—govern-
ment, private, and foreign—that Greece entered the crisis with. Fourth, 
Greece’s output drop at the early stages of the crisis appears to have been 
driven mainly by fiscal shocks and by the sudden stop (which raised fund-
ing costs). At the later stages of the crisis, however, the effects of these 
shocks appear to have subsided, and the shocks that account for pro-
tracted drop in output appear to be the slow resolution of nonperforming 
loans and price rigidities in product markets. Hence, the microdimension 
of the crisis may now have taken precedence over macroeconomic forces.
While our model captures a rich set of dynamics, it undoubtedly 
leaves aside many factors that may prove to be important when the 
final account will be written. One such factor is the uncertainty about 
EZ exit (Grexit). That uncertainty hampered investment and contrib-
uted to the liquidity problems of Greek banks. Retail deposits in Greek 
banks dropped by about 50% between 2009 and 2015, while they re-
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mained stable or even increased in Irish, Italian, Portuguese, and Span-
ish banks. Hence, uncertainty about EZ exit seems to have been much 
larger in Greece than in the other countries. Some of the effects of Grexit 
may be “relabeled” under other shocks in our model, such as the sud-
den stops, but introducing a more primitive shock may give a more 
accurate decomposition. Another factor that relates to the uncertainty 
is the political response to the crisis: domestic consensus on a strategy 
to exit the crisis was lacking in Greece, while it was present to a larger 
extent in other  crisis- hit EZ countries such as Ireland and Portugal.
Appendix A
Empirical Appendix
List of Countries
The list of countries and regions is in table A1.
Definition and List of Episodes
We adopt the following definition of episodes:
1. Sudden Stop. Our sudden stop episodes are constructed by com-
bining an output collapse filter and a capital flow reversal filter. To con-
struct the output collapse filter, we first identify all cumulated episodes 
of real GDP decline (see the annual real GDP growth from International 
Financial Statistics). We define an “output collapse” as in Calvo et al. 
(2006), when the cumulated decline in output exceeds the  within- group 
median (AE and EME). To construct the capital flow filter, we measure 
the changes in net capital flows as follows: (a) year- on- year change in 
the (opposite of the) current account relative to output, D4(−CAt / Yt) as 
in Korinek and Mendoza (2013), where Dkxt = xt − xt−k ; (b) year- on- 
year change in the (opposite of the) current account plus change in offi-
cial reserves, relative to output: D4((−CAt + DRESt) / Yt). This measure 
attempts to measure private capital flows; (c) year- on- year change in 
the cumulated change in the (opposite of the) current account + change 
in official reserves, relative to cumulated output, D4((−CA! t + DRES! t) / !Yt) 
where !Xt = Ss=03 Xt−s. (see current account, official reserves, and output 
in US dollars from IFS). For each measure of net capital inflows, an epi-
sode is triggered when net capital inflows fall more than two standard 
deviations away from the mean (both mean and standard deviation are 
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Table A1
List of Countries
Region  Countries
Latin America (13) Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Peru, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela
Asia (11) China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, South Korea, 
Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and 
Thailand
Middle East and North 
Africa (10)
Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, 
Oman, Tunisia, and United Arab Emirates
Central and Eastern 
European (15)
Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, 
Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Turkey
South Saharan Africa (3) Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria, and South Africa
Commonwealth of 
Independent States (5)
Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Russian Federation, and 
Ukraine
Advanced Economies  
(22) 
 
 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States
Table A2
List of Sudden Stop Episodes with Output Collapse
Country  Years  Country  Years
Advanced economies
Canada 1982 Denmark 2009
Germany 2009 Iceland 2010
Japan 2009 Netherlands 2009
Spain 2010, 2013 Sweden 1993
Switzerland 2009 United Kingdom 1981
United States 2009
Emerging- market economies
Argentina 1982, 1990, 2002 Bulgaria 2009
Chile 1983 Colombia 1999
Cote d’Ivoire 1984 Croatia 2014
Ecuador 1999 Estonia 2009
Hong Kong 1998 Hungary 2009
Indonesia 1998 Korea 1998
Lithuania 2009 Malaysia 1998
Mexico 1983, 1995 Philippines 1985
Romania 1999, 2010 Russia 1998, 2009
Slovak R. 2009 Slovenia 2009
Thailand 1998 Turkey 1994, 2001, 2009
U.A.E 2009 Ukraine 1999, 2009, 2014
Uruguay   1984         
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country specific). Consecutive episodes less than eight quarters apart 
are merged into a single episode. Finally, a sudden stop occurs in year t 
when the trough of the output collapse (output collapse filter) overlaps 
with a sudden stop episode, according to any of the above definitions.
2. Sovereign Defaults. Sovereign defaults are defined as in Gourin-
chas and Obstfeld (2012), based on the tabulations of Reinhart and Rog-
off (2009), Cantor and Packer (1995), and Chambers (2011). The year t of 
a sovereign debt crisis corresponds to the year identified with a default 
on domestic or external debt in these sources.
3. Lending Boom/Bust. We define a lending boom/bust episode as in 
Gourinchas et al. (2001), using the deviation of the ratio of credit to the 
nonfinancial sector to output from its trend (see bank credit to the nonfi-
nancial sector from BIS and depository corporations survey, claims on the 
private sector from IFS). The trend is an HP filter with smoothing param-
eter l = 1000. Define cytT  for the trend component of the  credit- to- output 
ratio cyt. A boom occurs whenever cyt > 1.14cytT (boom threshold). The 
boom begins when cyt > 1.05cytT (limit threshold) and ends when that 
limit threshold is crossed again. Episodes less than two years apart are 
combined. The year t of the lending boom is the year in which the maxi-
mum deviation from trend is achieved, within a given episode.
4. Trifecta. Trifecta crises are defined as a sovereign debt crisis that 
occurs during a sudden stop and a lending boom episode. These epi-
sodes are marked with a * in table A3.
Table A3
List of Sovereign Debt Crises
Country  Years  Country  Years
Argentina 1982, 1989, 2001* Brazil 1983, 1986, 1990, 2002
Bulgaria 1990 Chile 1983*
Cote d’Ivoire 1983, 2000 Croatia 1993
Dominican R. 1982, 2005 Ecuador 1982, 1999*, 2008
Egypt 1984 El Salvador 1981
Indonesia 1998*, 2002 Iraq 1990
Jamaica 2010 Jordan 1989
Kuwait 1990 Mexico 1982*
Morocco 1983, 1986 Nigeria 1982, 2001, 2004
Pakistan 1981, 1999 Panama 1983, 1987
Peru 1980, 1984 Philippines 1983
Poland 1981 Romania 1981, 1986
Russia 1991, 1993, 1998* Serbia 1983, 1992
South Africa 1985, 1989, 1993 Sri Lanka 1981, 1996
Turkey 1982, 2001* Ukraine 1998, 2000
Uruguay  1983*, 1987, 1990, 2003* Venezuela  1982, 1990, 1995, 1998, 2005
* Trifecta episodes.
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Appendix B
Calibration
This appendix contains more details on the calibration. Table A6 con-
tains the parameters that we choose to match  steady- state targets for 
Greece. Table A7 contains the fiscal rule parameters that we calibrate 
rather than estimate.
The following table describes the steady state of the model for reference. 
Table A4
List of Lending Booms
Country  Years  Country  Years
Advanced economies
Australia 1980 Canada 1982
Denmark 2009 Finland 1989
Greece 1985 Iceland 1982, 2006
Ireland 1981, 2009 Norway 1988, 2007
Portugal 1984, 2001, 2009 Spain 1982, 2007
Sweden 1990
Emerging- market economies
Argentina 1999, 2013 Belarus 2010
Bosnia 1997, 2008 Brazil 1995
Bulgaria 1991, 2008 Chile 1984, 2003
Colombia 1984, 1997, 2014 Croatia 1998
Czech R. 1997 Dominican R. 1989, 2003
Ecuador 1984, 1997 Egypt 1981, 2001
El Salvador 2000 Estonia 2009
Georgia 1997, 2008 Hong Kong 1983, 1997
Hungary 1990, 2009 Indonesia 1998
Iraq 2004 Israel 2002
Jamaica 1983, 1989, 2000, 2008 Jordan 2006
Kazakhstan 1993, 2007 Korea 1998
Kuwait 1988, 1998, 2009 Latvia 2010
Lebanon 2000 Lithuania 2008
Macedonia 2008 Malaysia 1997
Mexico 1981, 1994 Morocco 1981, 1997
Nigeria 1986, 2009 Oman 1998
Pakistan 1986, 2008 Panama 1981, 2001
Peru 1983, 1998 Philippines 1983, 1997, 2014
Poland 1992, 2009 Romania 1996, 2008
Russia 1995, 2009 Serbia 2000, 2010
Slovak R. 1999, 2008 Slovenia 1991, 2009
South Africa 2008 Sri Lanka 1983, 1995, 2006
Thailand 1997 Tunisia 1989
Turkey 1987, 1997 U.A.E 1988, 1998, 2009
Ukraine 2008 Uruguay 1982, 2002
Venezuela  2007, 2013     
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Standard Parameters
Parameter Description  Value
b Discount factor 0.97
a Capital share 1/3
eh Elasticity between H and F 1
e f Elasticity between exports 1
w Inverse labor supply elasticity 1
g Risk aversion 1
q Price stickiness 0.5
´ Elasticity of substitution goods 6
qw Wage stickiness 0.5
´w Elasticity of substitution labor 6
er Elasticity of R to NFA 0.0001
wk Adjustment cost 1
d Depreciation 0.07
FC  Fixed cost of production, 10% of Y 0.0955
Table A6
Internally Calibrated Parameters for Greece
Parameter Description  Value
√ Openness (Martin and Philippon 2014) 0.3
x Fraction of impatient (Martin and Philippon 2014) 0.65
D Annual lending spread of 2% 1.02
Bh / Y Household debt to GDP of 50% 0.5
Bg / Y Government debt to GDP of 120% 1.2
G / Y Government consumption to GDP of 20% 0.2
T / Y Public social expenditure to GDP of 20% 0.2
d h Steady- state default rate for households 5.4%
d k Steady- state default rate for corporates 5.4%
Bk / Y Corporate debt to GDP of 50% 0.5
csk Working capital constraint 1
t Tax rate, budget balance in SS 0.436
L  Leverage scaling  1
Table A7
Other Parameters
Parameter Description  Value
Fb Elasticity of govt. spending to public debt 0.05
Fn Elasticity of govt. spending to employment 0.025
Fr Elasticity of govt. spending to the int. rate 0.5
Fl  Persistence of govt. spending  0.75
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We focus on a zero inflation steady state, and normalize all price levels 
to 1, so that there is no distinction between variables in euros, or real 
variables deflated by either the CPI or the PPI. We also assume, for sim-
plicity, that NFA = 0 at the steady state, and that trade is balanced. This 
is straightforward to generalize by appropriately adapting the interest 
rate equation. Finally, we assume that  steady- state transfers from the 
government to the borrower are such that both agents choose the same 
amount of labor and consumption.
Appendix C
Estimation
Our priors impose that most estimated parameters be in the [0,1] inter-
val, with the exception of some of the elasticities for which we assume 
Gamma priors.
Figure A1 plots the priors with a thick line and the estimated poste-
rior distributions with a thin line for the dynamic parameters, with the 
posterior mode with a black dashed line. Our default priors for shock 
persistence and variances are Beta distributions with mean 0.85 and 
variance 0.1, and mean 0.2 and variance 0.1, respectively. The only ex-
ceptions are the spending and household debt shocks, where we lower 
the persistence and raise the variance due to the presence of an autore-
gressive term in the structural equations for these variables.
Using the Kalman Smoother at the posterior mode, we can retrieve 
sequences for the structural shocks in the model, which are shown in fig-
Table A8
 Steady- State Values
Variable  Description  Value
Y Output 0.9548
C = Cb = Cs Consumption 0.6315
N Labor 0.7830
W Wage rate 0.8767
R = Rg SOE and sovereign rates 1/b = 1.0309
G = T Government spending and transfers 0.1910
K Capital 1.8897
Q Investment Q 1
Rk = Rh Corporate debt and household debt rates 1.1116
Zk Rental rate of capital 0.1816
Rsk Working capital rate 1.02
Bg Government debt 1.1457
Bh  Household debt  0.4774
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Fig. A1. Priors, posteriors, and mode for the dynamic parameters
Note: The thin line is the posterior density, the thick line is the prior density, and the black 
dashed line is the posterior mode.
ure A2. These are obtained by applying the Kalman Smoother for the se-
quence of observables, with all parameters set at their posterior modes.
Impulse Responses
Figure A3 shows the impulse response to a private default shock, ´ t
def . 
The surge in private defaults increases the  private- sector funding cost 
and reduces the spending of impatient households who are at their bor-
rowing constraint. This adversely affects investment, output, and em-
ployment. As the economy enters a recession, sovereign yields increase. 
Government expenditures are the result of two offsetting forces: the 
recession increases spending (automatic stabilizers), but the increase in 
public debt triggers some automatic consolidation. The net effect is a 
mild decline in spending. Net exports improve as both competitiveness 
increases (lower domestic inflation) and domestic absorption declines.
Figure A4 shows the response of the economy to credit demand 
shock, ´tbh. Impatient households borrow to finance consumption. This 
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Fig. A2. Smoothed shocks
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initially stimulates output, employment, and inflation, but crowds out 
investment as credit risk increases, and therefore  private- funding costs, 
leading to a subsequent output decline. The increase in absorption ex-
ceeds output, so the current account deteriorates.
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1. The GDP per capita comes from Eurostat and is expressed in 2010 euros.
2. Ingram (1973) was among the first to articulate the view that sudden stops could not 
happen in a currency union, with the corollary that there was no need to monitor external 
imbalances. Against this view, Garber (1999) argued that the European payment system 
(target) at the core of the European Monetary Union could itself propagate a speculative 
attack.
3. An average during the period 1980–1995 would have been more informative of the 
state of the Greek economy before EZ entry. We use only the year 1995 because data be-
fore 1995 are not available or precise enough.
4. The fact that in the years immediately preceding and following EZ entry poorer 
members of the union—like Greece—would run large current account deficits was not a 
surprise. Rather, it is precisely what theory suggests should happen when countries catch 
up and converge, as argued by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) in an influential paper that 
examined the experience of Greece and Portugal. That paper also noted that Greece did 
not experience an investment boom following EZ entry and that the decline in saving was 
mostly driven by private saving.
5. Figure 4 starts in 1999 rather than 1980 because data before 1999 are not available. 
Subsequent figures also start later than 1980 for the same reason.
6. While figure 4 plots gross rather than net government external debt, gross external 
assets of the Greek government were negligible, as shown by Hyppolite (2016).
7. Ireland and Spain had significantly lower levels of public debt. Italy had much 
lower levels of net external debt. Portugal was in a position somewhat similar to Greece, 
although with smaller government debt and deficits.
8. The figures for Greek government debt during the crisis overstate the value of the 
debt, especially when Greece is compared to other high- debt countries such as Italy and 
Portugal. This is because Greek debt is computed in nominal terms, by adding the prin-
cipal (face value) payments that are due in all future years, rather than by adding all 
principal and coupon payments after discounting them at appropriate market rates. This 
overstates the value of the debt because assistance loans by the EZ during the crisis came 
with long maturities and below- market interest rates. In particular, the average interest 
rate on Greek debt is smaller than for Italy and Portugal. For estimates of Greek debt in 
present- value terms see, for example, Schumacher and Weder di Mauro (2015).
9. Like Calvo et al. (2006), Korinek and Mendoza (2014) focus on “systemic” sudden 
stops that occur in times of turmoil on global bond markets.
10. The appendix provides additional details. In short, we identify large output drops 
when the peak- to- trough cumulated output decline in a recession exceeds the median 
cumulated output decline within group (advanced or emerging markets). A sudden stop 
occurs when this large output drop overlaps a capital flow reversal episode, defined as 
a year- on- year decline in net capital inflows that is more than two standard deviations 
away from the country mean.
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11. See Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) for details.
12. See details in the appendix.
13. Technically, we record a trifecta episode when the sovereign default event t occurs 
during a lending boom episode and during a sudden stop episode.
14. Different dimensions of the Greek crisis unfolded at different times. According to our 
dating procedure, the lending boom peaked in 2008, the sovereign default occurred in 2012, 
and the collapse in output during the sudden stop episode occurred in 2013. Nevertheless, 
2010 is a natural starting point since specific concerns about the Greek economy arose first 
in late 2009. The five- year spread between Greece and Germany was 120 bp in September 
2009, but climbed to 277 bp by January 2010, before reaching 680 bp by April of that year.
15. We choose to begin in 1980 because of data availability and also because this period 
marks a phase of growing international financial integration, especially for emerging- 
market economies.
16. Our list includes all countries listed as emerging economies in either J.P. Morgan’s 
EMBIG index, the FTSE’s Group of Advanced or Secondary Emerging Markets, the MSCI- 
Barra classification of emerging or frontier economies and the Dow Jones list of emerging- 
market economies. We add to these countries Israel, Hong Kong, and Singapore, all coun-
tries that are now often included in the group of advanced economies but belong to the 
group of emerging- market economies for most of the sample. The list of countries in our 
sample is included in the appendix.
17. See Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1995) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) for 
seminal contributions.
18. Detailed sources for each variable are provided in the appendix.
19. By dating the Greek crisis in 2010 instead of later (see fn. 14), it may appear as if 
we mechanically make the Greek output collapse more protracted compared to other 
episodes where the output collapse may have started before t – 2. This is not a concern: 
the median duration of output collapses in our sample of sudden stops is 1.5 years for 
advanced economies and one year for emerging- market economies. Only two output col-
lapses last for six years or longer: Bosnia between 2008 and 2014 (six years) and Ukraine 
between 1992 and 1999 (seven years). Hence our choice of 2010 as the crisis year for 
Greece does not affect the results.
20. The economy of the United Arab Emirates experienced a sudden stop episode in 
2009 as a consequence of the burst of a real estate bubble, and the sharp decline in oil and 
natural gas prices in the immediate aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis. Real output 
per capita declined by 11%, 10.7%, and 16.4% in 2007, 2008, and 2009, respectively, culmi-
nating with the collapse of Dubai World in November 2009.
21. We classify countries into peggers and floaters based on the fine classification of Il-
zetzki et al. (2010). Peggers have an index smaller than 9. The sample consists of 20 floats, 
10 strict peggers, 15 de- peggers, and 2 others.
22. There are, of course, other differences between the Baltic countries and Greece and 
we want to acknowledge the limits of the comparison. For instance, price and wages 
adjusted more rapidly in Latvia than in Greece. Blanchard, Griffiths, and Bertrand (2013), 
in a case study of the Latvia boom, bust, and recovery, argue that internal devaluation 
worked fast in part due to nominal wage cuts, but also to rapid productivity increases 
that fueled a solid supply response. We explore in section VI what would have happened 
in Greece with more rapid price and wage adjustment.
23. As pointed out to us by M. Obstfeld, the fall in spending required by the unavoid-
able fiscal consolidation required a large real depreciation in order to maintain equilib-
rium on the market for nontraded goods. Absent an adjustment in the real exchange rate, 
the improvement in external balances must be associated with an output decline. See 
Corden and Neary (1982).
24. The literature on sovereign risk is large and we can only refer the reader to the clas-
sic contribution of Arellano (2008) and the recent survey by Aguiar and Amador (2014).
25. The rate that enters equation (3) is not necessarily the same as the one in equa-
tion (5) because debt is long term and only a fraction is refinanced every period. During 
the crisis, Greek debt was refinanced by official creditors at low rates, in equation (3), while 
the secondary market rate was high. This secondary rate is the one that enters equation (5).
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26. There are two types of models with heterogeneity: models where types are tran-
sient, as in Bewley models or Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2011), and models where types 
are permanent, as in Campbell and Mankiw (1989), Mankiw (2000), Eggertsson and Krug-
man (2012), and Martin and Philippon (2014). Midrigan and Philippon (2010) propose a 
hybrid model that includes precautionary savings, but is simple enough to incorporate 
in a standard macro model.
27. The assumption that this loan is intraperiod is made for simplicity. The fact that the 
loan is made by the bank allows for financial shocks to pass through to the production 
sector, with the added advantages that (a) we do not need to keep track of an extra state 
variable, and (b) we avoid any complications arising from the interaction of two dynamic 
frictions: nominal rigidities and financial frictions. If debt were intertemporal, we would 
have to keep track of the joint distribution of prices and debt, as firms with different 
preset prices would produce different quantities and thus borrow different amounts. In-
traperiod loans allow us to introduce a financial friction that is static from the firm’s point 
of view.
28. See Schmitt- Grohe and Uribe (2003).
29. To see why, simply pick some Rh ∈ (bs−1,bb−1). Given this rate and the other param-
eters, there is a unique steady state for bank equity, bank size, and so forth. Hence, there 
is a unique value for Bh. Now, as long as interest payments do not violate the non- 
negativity constraint on consumption (which never happens for reasonable values), then 
this level of Bh also satisfies the households’ problem, since for them Bh is a constraint. 
This shows that any Rh ∈ (bs−1,bb−1) is potentially an equilibrium, corresponding to differ-
ent values of Bh.
30. We treat the sovereign spread as a secondary market price that contains informa-
tion about sovereign risk. On the other hand, it does not enter the government budget 
constraint since Greece did not refinance its stock of debt at that price. In the budget con-
straint we scale down the spread by a factor of 5 so that it is in line with the data.
31. In practice, as we will see, domestic inflation deviates most from the model in 2010. 
According to the Bank of Greece, that year saw a surge in inflation due to a significant rise 
in oil prices and an increase in indirect taxes, in particular VAT.
32. The “dynamic” parameters are those parameters that are not required to compute 
the steady state and that only affect the dynamics of the model, such as the pass- 
through elasticities and the persistence as well as the standard deviation of the exogenous 
shocks (ri, si).
33. As discussed earlier, the model implies that domestic inflation starts declining as 
early as 2008. In the data we observe a spike in domestic inflation in 2009 and 2010, most 
likely due to the impact of oil prices (not modeled) and changes in the VAT rate (not 
modeled).
34. Knowledge of the structural shocks and the structural matrices that describe the 
law of motion for the endogenous variables as functions of the states allows us to estimate 
the contribution of each shock to the observed behavior of each variable in the model. 
This can be done for any endogenous variable, observed or not. Note that the plotted 
contributions of the shocks do not need to add up to the value of the variable due to initial 
conditions estimated by the Kalman filter.
35. Remember that we do not assume that the Greek government actually borrowed at 
these rates. In equation (3) the cash flows are much more stable.
36. As in the case of sovereign yields, one may argue that the borrowing rate for small 
and medium enterprises may not have been allocative at that time. However, recall that 
Greek banks could obtain liquidity at the ECB and the Bank of Greece against eligible 
collateral. Hence, the supply of loanable funds to the private sector was presumably not 
vertical.
37. We also performed another counterfactual where we remove the sudden stop on 
public capital by setting ´t
dg = 0. This corresponds to the situation that would have pre-
vailed in the presence of a sovereign debt “backstop” in the form of ECB or bailout guar-
anties. These results are available upon request.
38. In our model, eliminating fiscal profligacy would not have eliminated the Greek 
crisis altogether because we are still keeping the sudden stop and sovereign risk shocks. 
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Our estimates of the benefit of fiscal discipline are only a lower bound. This is the main 
difference with Martin and Philippon (2014), who estimate the impact of sovereign debt 
on the sudden stop itself. Martin and Philippon (2014) find much larger benefits of fiscal 
discipline, but their estimation requires cross- sectional information from different coun-
tries and is not feasible here.
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